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I. Introduction
The venture capital industry has undergone dramatic and
unprecedented change over the last decade. Relative to other areas
of the economy, this may not seem especially material given the
youth of the venture industry as a whole. The practice of venture
capital investing as we know it today began only about sixty years
ago,2 and not without serious reservations.3 Nevertheless, the
recent growth figures are more than noteworthy. During the six-
year period from 1997 to 2003 alone, the number of venture funds
actively investing jumped from 885 funds managing $64.6 billion
to 1,984 funds managing $251.4 billion.4 Nearly $200 billion of
venture capital was raised in the year 2000 alone.5 In short, the
venture capital industry has grown up.
The driver of this growth is plain. The technology bubble
of the mid- 1990s catapulted many venture capitalists, and the
entrepreneurs they supported, into positions of great wealth. From
1Of Counsel, Arnall Golden Gregory, LLP; Duke University, B.A., cum laude,
1994; University of Pennsylvania, J.D., cum laude, 1997. The author is the only
practicing attorney in the country to have completed the Kauffman Fellowship
Program, a competitive Fellowship designed to train professionals in and around
the venture capital industry.
2 See Paul A. Gompers, A Note on the Venture Capital Industry, Harvard
Business School Case Study No. 9-295-065 (Rev. Nov. 9, 1994), at 4
(summarizing the history of the venture capital industry).
3 See GEORGE W. FENN ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF THE PRIVATE EQUITY
MARKET, 168 STAFF STUDIES SERIES, 9-11 (1995) ("[P]ension fund managers
had long regarded venture capital investments as a potential violation of their
fiduciary responsibilities.").
4 Peter Morris, Presentation to venture capital conference in San Francisco (June
10, 2004).
5 Jesse Reyes, Presentation to the Kauffman Fellowship Program at Babson
College (Nov. 5, 2004).
1997 to 2000, the mainstream media was saturated with tales of
"new economy" risk-takers reaping millions overnight, to the
disturbing envy of the "old economy" establishment. While the
lucky few inflated their bank accounts, the jealous many inflated
their dreams into unrealistic ambitions. Thus was the context for
the venture capital industry expansion and the birth of the modem
day angel investor.
While the concept of "angel" investing has existed for
literally centuries,6 its emergence as a colloquial term and popular
pastime for wealthy individuals is a recent phenomenon. With
some variation, an angel investor is an individual investor
considered "accredited" by the federal securities laws, who has
disposable investment capital available for alternative asset class
investment, and chooses to invest in early-stage technology
companies. The divine nomenclature stems from the context in
which a typical angel investment is made-namely, at the nascent
stages of a company's life when only the most beneficent investor
would consider providing investment capital. This first financing
round is sometimes called the "friends and family round," since
many angel investors have pre-existing relationships with the
entrepreneurs in whose companies they invest.
7
Angels generally invest with the expectation that, should
the company progress as planned, one or more venture capital
("VC") firms will subsequently invest in the company's first
"institutional round" of financing. Ideally, this second financing
round will involve the sale of company stock at a higher valuation
than at the angel round, resulting in some but not dramatic dilution
of the angel's equity holdings. This process of selling stock to
venture investors continues through the company's life until the
investors realize an "exit opportunity," which is a financing event
after which investors may liquidate their holdings. The potential
reward gained from such an exit event, anticipated to be at a
6 Cyrus Field had several angel investors in his transatlantic cable venture. See
JOHN STEELE GORDON, A THREAD ACROSS THE OCEAN 40 (2002). In 19th
century America, angel investors were referred to as "adventurers."
7 See Joseph W. Bartlett & Kevin R. Garlitz, Fiduciary Duties in
Burnout/Cramdown Financings, 20 J. CORP. L. 593, 600 (1995) ("The angels
invest on the strength of some form of personal relationship with the founder.").
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valuation much higher than the angel's initial investment, must be
sufficiently high to justify the substantial risk taken during the
angel round.
The angel investor community has grown alongside and
beneath its venture capital counterpart, serving the significant role
of supporting new companies from the point of conception through
to institutional legitimacy. 8 Angels have become more prominent
and accessible over time, and are now common shareholders in the
typical venture capital portfolio company. Many have banded
together to create branded regional organizations focusing on
sharing deal flow,9 utilizing communal resources such as lawyers
and accountants, and providing capital for new venture capital-
backed start-up companies ("start-up companies") in their home
region.' 0 Moreover, the very definition of an angel investor has
changed in relation to its larger venture capital cousin. While
typical venture capital funds have grown in size to $200 million or
higher, smaller venture capital firms, generally with funds of $50
million or less, are now sometimes referred to as "angel funds,"
since their small size and investment style is more akin to "nascent
8 The Kauffman Foundation of Kansas City sponsored and endorsed the creation
of the Angel Capital Association in late 2003. See Press Release, First Network
for Angel Investing Groups Formed (Nov. 11, 2003), available at
http://www.kauffnan.org/news.cfrn/382 (citing a statistic from the Center of
Venture Research that angel investors had deployed $15.7 billion in United
States entrepreneurial businesses during 2002) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
9 "Deal flow" refers to the rate and quality of investment opportunities to which
a private investor becomes exposed. The concept of deal flow is particularly
important in the inefficient financial markets of private equity. Public markets,
in contrast, are very efficient because information regarding investment
opportunities is so readily available. While such immediate and comprehensive
disclosure is generally good for investors in the aggregate, its accessibility
hinders any given investor's ability to achieve extraordinary returns. Private
equity's inefficiency stems from its relative secrecy, giving those investors with
unique access to the good investment opportunities, or "deal flow", the chance
to reap extraordinary returns.
10 The Angel Capital Association website boasts membership by 200 regional
angel investment organizations throughout the United States and Canada. See
Angel Capital Association, at http://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/ (last
visited Apr. 13, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
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stage" angel investing than "early stage" venture investing. This
article refers to both wealthy individuals and these smaller venture
funds as "angel investors," since both are subject to the risk of
minority shareholder oppression.
In theory, the role of the angel investor is magnanimous,
exciting, and, in some cases, even heroic. 1 Many active angel
investors consider themselves to be the driving force of America's
innovation engine, flush with patriotic pride as they wire funds to
fledgling start-ups. The justification for angel investing also rests
upon an attractive risk/reward model. As the argument goes, since
angel investors take the most risk of any investors during the life of
a new company, they stand to reap the greatest reward. While this
may have been true in the past, the realities of venture capital
investment practice have in many ways turned this theory on its
head.
Venture capitalists are sophisticated financial investors
charged with the sober responsibility of investing their funds'
capital (usually supplied by pension funds or other non-trivial
sources) in very risky early stage companies. Since many of the
investments in a given VC's portfolio fail, the VC must be in a
position to squeeze the most return out of those few companies that
are successful. Consequently, VCs will often seek to structure the
terms of investments so as to maximize their control of, and thus
reward from, their portfolio companies. The specifics of these
terms are well documented in other commentaries and beyond the
scope of this article. What is important here is the resulting control
11 See Gompers, supra note 2, at 4 (commenting on how one of the first modem
early stage venture capital firms invested in a company developing X-ray
technology to treat cancer because of "the ethics of the thing and the human
qualities of treating cancer"). Peter Cooper, an angel investor in the first
transatlantic telegraph cable venture, noted that his investment decision was
driven by a desire for
the consummation of that great prophecy, that 'knowledge
shall cover the earth, as the waters cover the deep,' and with
that feeling I joined [the venture] in what then appeared to
most men a wild and visionary scheme .... But believing, as
I did, that it offered the possibility of a mighty power for the
good of the world, I embarked on it.
See GORDON, supra note 6, at 40.
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of the company by the VC (or group of VCs acting in tandem by
explicit cooperation or implicit alignment of interest), achieved
either by owning a majority of the company's voting stock (or
holding veto rights over certain actions and decisions of the
company), controlling a majority of the company's board of
directors, or both. Control of the company in this manner often
appears fair and reasonable at the time of the VC's initial
investment when each of the company's founders, angel investors,
and VC investors are aligned in interest to grow their exciting new
venture. The problems arise when things do not go as planned, and
the interests of these three shareholder constituencies diverge. In
such event, burdened by duties to maximize returns to a
demanding limited partner investor base, the VC will invoke its
control of the company to further its distinct interests at the
expense of the angel investor.
12
The potential for abuse is high, as many "burned angels"
have learned, while the means for legal redress have not yet been
properly tested in court. Recent market trends, however, are
increasing the likelihood that we will see such a test sooner rather
than later. The unusual investment dynamics from 2001 through
2004, which brought about many highly dilutive "down rounds,"'
' 3
have set the stage for legal claims that aggrieved angels may assert
in coming years. In the heydays of 1999 and 2000, angel
investments in start-up companies were quickly followed by
venture capital investment. When the bubble popped, however,
many of these companies watched their cash reserves diminish in
12 See Joan L. Lesser & Carrie E. Johnson, Financing Troubled Companies:
Highly Dilutive (Down Round) Financings, 20 No. 1 COMPUTER & INTERNET
LAW 1, 2 (2003) ("[D]own-round financings frequently include terms designed
to protect the value of the venture capitalists' investment .... Such terms not
only restrict a company's flexibility and create a precedent for future financings
but also tend to impair severely the value of, or even render worthless, securities
held by existing investors."). Angels are much more at risk of suffering damage
than the company's founders for several reasons. See infra Part IV.
13 A "down round" occurs when a company's per share stock price declines from
one financing event to the next, reducing the enterprise value and diluting all
prior shareholders. Holders of preferred stock usually have some level of anti-
dilution protection in the event of a down round, the presence of which results in
exacerbated dilution to common stock holders who do not enjoy such protection.
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the face of a tight-fisted investment climate. Raising new capital
became extremely difficult, often forcing companies to raise
additional funds from their current investor base. 14 The VCs, with
larger holdings and deeper pockets than their fellow angel
investors, often ended up effectively dictating the terms of these
"insider" rounds, in many cases without legitimate arms-length
negotiation since they also controlled or at least substantially
influenced the companies in which they were investing.
Consequential negative effects on angel investor holdings were
typical.
As we move through the improving capital markets of
2005, some of those same companies that struggled through insider
or down rounds are improving their performance, growing well,
and now have a reasonable chance of achieving a profitable return.
If and when this happens, angel investors will be able to quantify
their losses and, in appropriate cases, justify initiating litigation.15
While some cases of this ilk have been launched, none have
survived pre-trial settlement, 16 and theories of liability postulated
by commentators are, accordingly, still only theories.
This article analyzes the claims angel investors might bring
against VCs who took companies through insider rounds with
"abusive" terms. Part II introduces the concept of close
corporation law, well-established in American jurisprudence, and
concludes that venture-backed start-up companies would likely be
treated as close corporations in the eyes of the courts. Part III then
14 See Willie Dennis & David Englander, Down Rounds and Washouts, 1344
PLI/CoRP. 279, 281 ("Today, in contrast [to the late 1990s], valuations for
companies seeking follow-on financings are frequently well below the
valuations at which the previous financings were completed .... Accordingly,
the only way to attract additional financing, even from the inside investors, is to
price the nextround below the prior round.").
15 In most cases, full litigation is a practical reality. Most angel investors are
wealthy and possess the wherewithal to hire competent counsel and take a claim
through to its resolution in court. There are strong incentives for a defendant
venture capital firm to settle a claim, but the size of some losses may preclude
any reasonable settlement amounts.
16 See Constance Loizos, Entrepreneur Settles Suit With Lightspeed,
Corn Ventures, PRIVATE EQUITY WK., Feb. 11, 2005; Scott Herhold, Venture
Capitalists Settle Suit, San Jose Mercury News, Feb. 20, 1997, at 1 C (covering a
dispute of the settlement of a start-up company called Alantec Inc.).
[VOL. 6
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presents what has become known as the close corporation
"minority oppression doctrine," outlining a set of principles courts
have established to protect minority shareholders in close
corporations from the potential abuses of a controlling shareholder
group, such as that comprised of VC investors. Particular attention
is given to jurisdictions likely to address venture capital
shareholder issues first, namely Massachusetts, California, New
York, and, of course, Delaware. Part IV describes in more detail
the role angels play as investors in nascent and early-stage
companies, their motivations and expectations when making their
investments, and the specific areas where risk of abuse against
them is high. A listing of distinctions between an angel's interests
and those of the company's founders and venture investors is also
provided to highlight how and when the angel's unique interests
can be subordinated to those of the company's other, more
influential shareholder constituents. Part V applies the minority
oppression doctrine to the plight of angels in venture-backed start-
up companies, concluding that courts will likely recognize a claim
of oppression by an angel plaintiff, but the substantive result may
vary depending on the jurisdiction in which the suit is brought and
the particular facts of a case. Policy arguments are presented,
highlighting the need to balance a shareholding majority's right to
corporate control with an angel investor's right to participate in the
company's liquidity event, recognizing the critical need to preserve
the expectations of both to ensure their future participation.
Finally, Part VI prescribes specific actions venture capitalists may
take to reduce their liability in the face of such claims. The article
concludes by suggesting that angel investors may be able to bring
successful claims against venture capital investors based on some
variant of the minority oppression doctrine in each of the
jurisdictions reviewed. However, there are certain steps venture
capital firms can take before and during a dilutive transaction to
help sanitize their actions and defend themselves.
II. Venture Capital Start-up Companies as "Close
Corporations"
The bulk of corporate law jurisprudence is directed toward
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the typical public company where capital market forces usually can
help provide shareholders with some "invisible hand" protection. 17
In publicly traded companies, where risk-bearing and management
are separate, some level of market accountability can keep agency
costs contained, and the presence of an accessible liquid market
provides an immediate exit for a disgruntled shareholder.' 8 How
to manage the corporation's profits is a question for the board of
directors, which may decide to reinvest or declare a dividend.
Unhappy shareholders may protest the board's decisions by
waging a proxy fight or, more simply, selling their stock in the
open market. Privately held close corporations, on the other hand,
do not generally exhibit these characteristics, and their
shareholders accordingly do not enjoy the inherent structural
protections relied upon by their public company counterparts. 1 9
Commentators have noted extensively how conventional corporate
law's alplication to the close corporation could lead to unfair
results. "Both legislatures and courts have reacted to these
observations, albeit in varying ways, and have consequentially laid
the groundwork to treat the legal rights of shareholders in public
and private companies differently when warranted.2' Indeed, an
17 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 80 (2d ed. 1985).
18 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. RISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 228-37 (1991).
19 See Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held
Corporations, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1099, 1100 (1999) (noting how influential
courts have "recognized that shareholders in closely held corporations have a
different set of expectations and vulnerabilities than do shareholders in publicly
held corporations").20 See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The
Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 757 (2000)
("Conventional corporate law norms of majority rule and centralized control can
lead to serious problems for the close corporation minority shareholder.");
Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause ofAction for Oppression, 48
Bus. LAW. 699, 702-03 (1993) ("In a closed setting, the corporate norms of
centralized control and majority rule easily can become instruments of
oppression.").
21 See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 473 (Cal. 1969)
(noting that traditional corporate law "failed to afford adequate protection to
minority shareholders and particularly to those in closely held corporations
whose disadvantageous and often precarious position renders them particularly
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 6
entire body of law has sprung up and flourished to address the
legal relationship of a close corporation's shareholders.
22
A. The Close Corporation Defined
A number of definitions have been proposed over the years
to identify a "close corporation., 23 Among the most cited,
particularly in jurisdictions relevant to this article's topic, is that
set forth a mere thirty years ago by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.24 In Donahue,
Massachusetts defined a close corporation as having "(1) a small
number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate
stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the
management, direction and operations of the corporation.
2 5
It is easy to see how minority shareholders can be
particularly vulnerable in such a context. Voting control gives the
majority shareholder or shareholder group the keys to the corporate
machinery, while the lack of a liquid market makes it very difficult
for dissenting minority shareholders to sell their shares.26 Majority
vulnerable to the vagaries of the majority"); Quinn v. Cardiovascular Physicians,
P.C., 326 S.E.2d 460, 463 (Ga. 1985) (holding that all shareholders need
protection because "in close corporations, minority stockholders may easily be
reduced to relative insignificance and their investment rendered captive");
Walensky v. Jonathan Royce Intern., Inc., 624 A.2d 613, 615 (NJ App.
Div. 1993) (noting the particular vulnerability of minority shareholders in close
corporations); see also Thompson, supra note 20, at 699 ("Corporate statutes
and judicial decisions reflect norms designed for publicly held corporations and
do not always meet the needs of closely held enterprises.").
22 The authoritative treatise on close corporation law, cited regularly by courts
and commentators, is F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S
CLOSE CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1998).
2 3 See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELvIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CORPORATIONS 389 (7th ed. 1995) ("Exactly what constitutes a close
corporation is often a matter of theoretical dispute. Some authorities emphasize
the number of shareholders, some the lack of a market for the corporation's
stock, and some the existence of formal restrictions on the transferability of the
corporation's shares.").
24 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). For further discussion on Donahue and its
?rogeny, see infra Part III.A.
Id. at 511.26See Manuel A. Utset, A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete
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control, which usually goes hand in hand with board control,
2 7
enables such abuses as the imposition of policies to pay special
dividends or salary bonuses to some shareholders but not others,28
an offer by the company to purchase one shareholder's shares at a
high price but not make the same offer to other shareholders,29 or a
self-serving diversion of the company's assets or opportunities to
an entity controlled by the majority shareholders. Other popular
forms of minority shareholder oppression include forcing a
minority to sell its shares to the company at an unreasonably low
price (a "squeezeout"), 31 merging the company with a shell
Contracting: The Case of Shareholder Contracts, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 1329,
1339 (2003). Utset notes that
[t]here are two principal characteristics of close corporations
responsible for the significant power majority shareholders
wield over the welfare of minority shareholders. First,
majority shareholders control the corporation, giving them
wide latitude in making corporate decisions. Second, unlike
non-controlling shareholders in public corporations, minority
shareholders who disagree with the actions of majority
shareholders cannot easily exit by selling their shares in a
public market.
Id.
27 See Moll, supra note 20, at 757 ("In a close corporation, the board is
ordinarily controlled 'by the shareholder or shareholders holding a majority of
the voting power."') (citing Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith? The
Foibles of Fairness in the Law of Close Corporations, 16 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 1143, 1148 (1990)).
28 See Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1986) (involving a case
where a majority shareholder caused the company to pay him excessive salary
and bonuses while denying any salary or dividends to other shareholders).
29 See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
30 See Thorpe v. Cerbco, Inc. 676 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996).
31 The term "squeezeout" in this context has been defined as "the use by some of
the owners or participants in a business enterprise of strategic position, inside
information, or powers of control, or the utilization of some legal device or
technique, to eliminate from the enterprise one or more of its owners or
participants." O'NEAL, supra note 17, at § 1.01, 1. Professor O'Neal has also
identified a "partial squeezeout" as "action which reduces the participation or
powers of a group of participants in the enterprise, diminishes their claim on
earnings or assets, or otherwise deprives them of business income or advantages
to which they are entitled." Id. at § 1.01, 1-2. See generally id., §§ 3:01-3:20,
4:01-4:08, 5:01-5:39 (describing various squeezeout and partial squeezeout
techniques).
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corporation controlled by the majority shareholders under terms
that force the minority to redeem their shares for cash at a low
value (a "freezeout"), 32 or consummating a financial restructuring
that significantly dilutes a minority shareholder's holdings to the
point of being worthless (a "washout").33
B. Application to Venture Capital Start-up
Companies
The majority of close corporation case law deals with
businesses founded by family members or friends in non-
technology industries where things have gone awry. Although
there have been a few cases filed against venture capital investors
in start-ups in connection with their duties as directors,34 and at
least one against venture capital investors in their role as majority
shareholders, 35 start-up companies and venture capital investment
firms generally have not been quick to go to court.3 6 However,
32 See Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 479 N.E.2d 173 (Mass. 1985); Sullivan v. First
Massachusetts Financial Corp., 569 N.E.2d 814 (Mass. 1991); see also Douglas
K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Texas Close Corporations.: Majority Rule
isn't What it Used to Be, 1 Hous. Bus. & TAX. L.J. 12, 15 (2001) (noting that
actions by a majority shareholder that are harmful to minority shareholder
interests "are often referred to as 'freeze-out' or 'squeeze-out' techniques that
'oppress' the close corporation minority shareholder"). See generally O'NEAL,
supra 17, at § 3.06 (2d ed. 1985).
33 See Jose M. Padilla, What's Wrong with a Washout?: Fiduciary Duties of the
Venture Capitalist Investor in a Washout Financing, 1 Hous. Bus. & TAX. L.J.
269, 271 (2001) (noting how the financial distress of a company can force the
minority shareholders to accept draconian washout terms in order to continue
the company's operations). Mr. Padilla cites a number of other names for the
"washout," the favored technique of the venture capitalist, including "restart,"
"restructuring," "burnout," "cramdown," "down round," "downside" and
"dilutive." Id. at 270 n.6.
34 See Orban v. Field, 1997 Del. Ch. Lexis 48 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997); Equity-
Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 1997).
35 See Kalashian v. Advent VI L.P., Case No. CV739278 (Sup. Ct. Santa Clara
Co., Cal. filed Mar. 23, 1994).
36 Aside from the general youth of the industry, an oft-cited reason for VCs'
conspicuous absence from court is the overwhelming value placed on reputation
and connections. The world of venture finance is small while the pool of
entrepreneurs seeking venture capital seems to be bottomless. VCs regularly
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should angel investors in VC-backed start-up companies become
more litigious, as predicted in Part IV infra, courts would likely
treat start-up companies in the same fashion as close corporations
for the purpose of protecting minority shareholders from abuse.
The Donahue definition is easy to apply to the standard VC
portfolio company. First, start-up companies, like close
corporations, typically have few shareholders. The usual start-up
company capitalization structure includes a minority position held
by the founders, a minority position held by the angel investors, a
small portion of common stock reserved for employees as part of
an option incentive plan, and the balance held by the venture
capital investors. With some variation, it is highly unusual for a
start-up company to have more than one hundred shareholders.
Most VCs, seeking to avoid an unwieldy shareholder base size,
typically negotiate stock transfer restrictions among investors to
intentionally keep the number of shareholders small.
Second, start-up companies do not enjoy a ready liquid
market for their shares. These companies issue securities in
reliance on the small issuance 37 or private issuance 38 exceptions to
§ 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. 39 This may be the most
significant distinction between a private company shareholder and
his public company shareholder counterpart. "In a large public
corporation, the oppressed or dissident minority stockholder could
sell his stock in order to extricate some of his invested capital. By
definition, this market is not available for shares in the close
corporation. Moreover, a VC will usually include a right of first
boast that they invest in only one company for every one hundred they reject.
This supply-demand imbalance is blamed for tilting the bargaining power
toward the VC. Combine this power with the well-documented incestuous
nature of the small VC industry and it is not unreasonable for a potential
plaintiff to feel that any litigious steps toward a VC would bar him from the
ability to ever seek venture capital again. Moreover, should an entrepreneur or
angel be so bold as to threaten such litigation, the VC would have an incentive
to settle to avoid stinging publicity from so rare an event.
37 See Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a) (11), 15 U.S.C § 77a et seq. (2005).
38 See Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2).
39 See Securities Act of 1933 § 5.
40 Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 514; see also Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019,
1027 (N.J. 1993) ("[U]nlike shareholders in larger corporations, minority
shareholders in a close corporation cannot readily sell their shares when they
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refusal41 and a co-sale right42 as conditions to its investment,
further shackling shareholders who may want to try to sell their
shares.
Third, a start-up company's small shareholder base is made
up of different constituencies who are all very interested in the
company's development and frequently highly involved in its
management, direction, and operation. Employees who own stock,
which is common for start-up companies, are obviously involved
in the management. VCs manifest their involvement through two
primary means: (1) as board members, and (2) as preferred
shareholders with enhanced voting rights. VCs will assume
significant influence on the board as a condition to investment, and
sometimes will enhance their influence by requiring the specific
approval of the "VC directors" before the company may
consummate certain transactions. 43 Furthermore, VCs typically sit
on the board's hiring or compensation committee, giving them
obvious and substantial influence over senior management.
Start-up company charters usually enumerate a host of
transactions, some as banal as hiring managers or borrowing
money to purchase necessary equipment, which cannot be
consummated without the approval of the preferred stock voting as
a separate class or with supermajority influence. Again, the
effective result is to give the VCs enhanced influence and control
over the company's operations.
Angels are usually the only shareholder group that is not
become dissatisfied with the management of the corporation.").
41 A right of first refusal forces a shareholder who has found an interested buyer
to give the company or the other shareholders (or both) the right to buy
(essentially a call option) the selling shareholder's shares first before any sales
to a third party are permitted.
42 In the event neither the company nor the other shareholders purchase all of the
shares for sale pursuant to their right of first refusal thus enabling a sale to the
third party, the cosale right (also known as a "tag along" right) forces the selling
shareholder to include the shares of his other shareholders in the sale to the third
party, cutting back on the number of his own shares he can sell to the extent
necessary.
43 An example would be the issuance of a new series of stock with liquidation
preferences senior to that held by the VCs. This essentially gives VCs a veto
right over the company's ability to accept new capital, providing substantial
bargaining power and control.
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involved in the company's management on a regular basis, though
this external position is not necessarily freely chosen. Upon the
consummation of the first institutional financing round, they are
replaced on the board by representatives of the new VC investors,
have their information rights reduced, and sometimes see their
founding team under the supervision of a new VC-selected CEO
whom they usually have little say in selecting. 44
Perhaps more important than whether VC start-up
companies fit within the letter of the close corporation definition is
whether they fit within its spirit. Close corporation law in general,
and its minority oppression doctrine in particular, were developed
and have evolved to protect shareholders from abuse at the hands
of the controlling shareholder group. While some of the abuses
common in traditional close corporations may not apply to VC
start-up companies, the majority of them remain real dangers in
both contexts. Squeezeouts, freezeouts, and especially washouts
are techniques occasionally found in the VC-backed start-up
company context.45 Indeed, many commentators have assumed the
application of close corporation law to venture capital start-up
companies.46
In sum, since minority shareholders in start-up companies
(namely angel investors) are at the same risk of majority
oppression as their counterpart minority shareholders in traditional
close corporations, they are just as deserving of the same
protections. In fact, given the sophistication and aggressive profit
motive of venture capital investors coupled with the large sums of
money to be gained or lost, angel investors in start-up companies
may actually be at greater risk and require enhanced protection.
44See infra Part IV on the decreasing influence of angels as a start-up company
Erows through successive financing rounds.
See Kalashian v. Advent VI L.P., Case No. CV739278 (Sup. Ct. Santa Clara
Co., Cal. filed Mar. 23, 1994) (addressing washout claims against a venture
capital investor in Alantec Corporation that eventually ended in a large
settlement payout from the VC to Alantec's founders). See generally Matthew
P. Quilter et al., Duties of Directors: Venture Capitalist Board Representatives
and Conflicts of Interest, 1312 PLUCoRP. 1101 (June 2002).
46 See, e.g., Padilla, supra note 33, at 280-84 (citing Massachusetts' Donahue
case and its progeny as authority for the protection of minority shareholders in
venture capital start-up companies); Bartlett & Garlitz, supra note 7, at 610-16.
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The rest of this article will discuss the kinds of protections courts
have provided to minority shareholders in traditional close
corporations, and suggest how those same protections could help
angel investors in the venture start-up company context.
III. The Minority Oppression Doctrine in Close
Corporation Law
While Massachusetts' 1975 Donahue case is often cited as
the foundation of the minority oppression doctrine's judicial
recognition, in truth, courts in many jurisdictions have been
granting similar (albeit arguably undisciplined) protections to
minority shareholders for decades.47 The doctrine is grounded in a
concept of fiduciary duty, based on principles of equity, which
"often acts as an important restraint on [oppressive] action by
controlling shareholders that seems clearly permitted by the
language of the applicable statute.
'A8
There are two general theories of liability minority
shareholders in close corporations look to when considering a
claim: (1) a breach of fiduciary duty held by majority
shareholders; and (2) a breach of fiduciary duty held by the board
of directors. This Part will review the law in jurisdictions likely to
47 See, e.g., Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 123 N.E. 148, 151-52 (N.Y.
1919); Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99 A.2d 236 (Del. Ch. 1953)
(recognizing the duty held by majority shareholders to the minority). In
Kavanaugh, the court stated that,
[when a number of shareholders] constitute themselves, or are
by the law constituted, the managers of corporate affairs or
interests, they stand in much the same attitude towards the
other or minority stockholders that the directors sustain
generally towards all the stockholders, and the law requires of
them the utmost good faith.... [and a court of equity] will
protect a minority stockholder against the acts or threatened
acts of the board of directors or of the managing stockholders
of the corporation, which violate the fiduciary relation and are
directly injurious to the stockholders.
123 N.E. at 151-52.
48 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 17, at § 7:3; see also Schnell v. Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) ("[I]nequitable action does not
become permissible simply because it is legally possible.").
be battlegrounds for application of the doctrine in the venture
capital start-up company context-namely, Massachusetts, New
York, California, and Delaware.49 Each of these jurisdictions
treats claim (1) differently, while claim (2) is more or less
governed nationally by reference to Delaware common law.
A. The Duty Owed by Majority Shareholders to
Minority Shareholders
Claim (2) relating to director duties is a favorite
commentator topic. Corporate board rooms, law school
classrooms, and legal journals spend great time and effort
addressing the fiduciary duties held by corporate directors to
corporate shareholders. In contrast, much less attention is given to
the notion of fiduciary duties held between and among
shareholders directly, likely because such duties are only relevant
where relatively few shareholders may constitute and wield
majority influence over a corporation's actions. This kind of
strong influence from a few shareholders is rare in public
companies, but it is typical in close corporations and venture
capital start-ups. Indeed, many venture capital professionals, well-
schooled in their duties as directors, are often wholly unaware of
their additional fiduciary duties as majority shareholders,
notwithstanding the fact that such shareholder duties have been
recognized for nearly a century. The highest court in New York
noted as early as 1919 that whenever a number of shareholders
49 See THoMSON VENTURE ECONOMICS, NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL
AsSOCIATION 2004 YEARBOOK, Figure 1.05, 19 (2004) (listing California, New
York, and Massachusetts as the top three states ranked by venture capital under
management in 2003, with $97.3 billion, $44.1 billion and $42.6 billion,
respectively). Silicon Valley surrounding California's San Francisco area and
Waltham surrounding Massachusetts' Boston area are the two most concentrated
centers of venture capital firms and start-up companies in the United States. See
id. at Figure 9.0, 12 (listing California, Massachusetts, and New York as the
first, second, and fifth ranked states by venture capital dollars received by
companies based in those states, receiving $7.6 billion, $2.5 billion, and $0.7
billion, respectively). While start-up companies may be located anywhere,
many choose Delaware as their state of incorporation, sometimes at the
insistence of their VC investors. Accordingly, these four jurisdictions are likely
to be among the first to develop case law in this area in coming years.
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constitute themselves, or are by the law constituted,
the managers of corporate affairs or interests, they
stand in much the same attitude toward all the
stockholders, and the law requires of them the
utmost good faith [such that a court] will protect a
minority stockholder against the acts or threatened
acts of the board of directors or of the managing
stockholders of the corporation, which violate the
fiduciary relation and are directly injurious to the
stockholders.
50
Professor F. Hodge O'Neal has more recently been quick to note
that "[tihere is also a growing recognition that controlling
shareholders stand in a fiduciary relationship to the corporation
and to minority shareholders., 51 A few states have even codified
50 Kavanaugh, 123 N.E. at 151-52 (1919). The courts of Delaware have
formally recognized a similar duty for nearly as long, as noted in its holding in
Allied Chemical & Dye Corporation v. Steel & Tube Co. ofAmerica, 120 A.
486,491 (1923):
The same considerations of fundamental justice which impose
a fiduciary character upon the relationship of the directors to
the stockholders will also impose, in a proper case, a like
character upon the relationship which the majority of
stockholders bear to the minority. When, in the conduct of the
corporate business, a majority of the voting power in the
corporation join hands in imposing its policy upon all, it is
beyond all reason and contrary, it seems to me, to the plainest
dictates of what is just and right, to take any view other than
that they are to be regarded as having placed upon themselves
the same sort of fiduciary character which the law impresses
upon the directors in their relation to all the stockholders.
Id.
51 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 17, at § 7:13. For additional case law
recognizing the fiduciary duty held by majority shareholders to the minority, see
Burton v. Exxon Corp., 583 F. Supp. 405, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[T]he status of
a majority stockholder or parent corporation carries with it a fiduciary duty...
to be fair in their dealings insofar as those dealings affected the interests of the
minority stockholders."); Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217 (1989) (holding that
"freeze out" and "squeeze out" attempts by majority to shareholders to deprive
minority shareholders of the benefits of their investments constitute breaches of
fiduciary duty to the minority); Ferber v. American Lamp Corp., 469 A.2d 1046
(Pa. 1983) (noting that the majority shareholders may not use their power to
exclude minority shareholders from their proper share of the benefits accruing
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these inter-shareholder fiduciary duties by statute.52
B. The Oppression Doctrine in Massachusetts-the
Majority Shareholder Perspective
The Massachusetts Superior Judicial Court's decision in
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype is often cited as establishing a cause
of action by oppressed minority shareholders against their majority
oppressors in a close corporation. Donahue held that whenever
certain shareholders receive a benefit from the corporation, all
shareholders must have equal access to that benefit.53 More
broadly, the court held that all shareholders in a close corporation
owe each other a fiduciary duty of "the utmost good faith and
loyalty," and "may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-
interest in derogation to their duty of loyalty to the other
stockholders and to the corporation. 54 Indeed, Donahue suggests
that this duty between shareholders may be even more stringent
than that held by directors toward the corporation's shareholders.55
from the company and that the majority may only act in its best interest when it
is also in the best interest of all the shareholders).
The concept of a fiduciary relationship is borrowed from the law of
trusts and, some commentators have noted, is actually misapplied when used in
the shareholder relationship context. See Ragazzo, supra note 19, at 1104-05
(1999). Ragazzo notes that
[a]lthough Donahue denominated this newly created
shareholder duty as 'fiduciary' in nature, this designation is a
misnomer. A true fiduciary is required to act in a non-selfish
manner for the benefit of some other party .... However,
controlling shareholders in closely held corporations, like all
other shareholders, have legitimate selfish interests. Thus, the
'fiduciary' duty recognized in Donahue is really a duty to act
fairly toward other shareholders.
Id.
52 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(l)(a)(2)(2001) (authorizing a court to
grant relief when "those in control of the corporation have acted.., in a manner
unfairly prejudicial toward one or more shareholders in their capacities as
shareholders, directors, or officers, or as employees of a closely held
corporation"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115b(3) (2001).
53 See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 518-19.54 1d. at 515.
55 Id. at 515; see also Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492
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Massachusetts also took advantage of the Donahue case to
establish a direct right of action for minority shareholders against
their fellow majority holders.56 The court recognized that other
remedies traditionally available to shareholders were absent or
obviously futile in the close corporation context, such as a
derivative action,57 the statutory remedy of dissolution,58 and the
ability to sell one's shares into a fair and liquid market.59 The
creation of a direct claim was an attempt to fill a frustrating
vacuum of practical redress by a minority shareholder who is
subject to oppressive conduct and, for all intents and purposes, is
"trapped in a disadvantageous situation."60 The creation of the
direct claim highlights the privity of the duty between fellow
shareholders, since "[t]he claim is asserted in the shareholder's
personal capacity, not derivatively on behalf of the corporation,
and it lies directly against the shareholder who breached his or her
fiduciary duty, not against the corporation."
61
What became known as the "equal opportunity principle"
as set forth in Donahue quickly sparked controversy and criticism
amid fears that such a rule would unduly limit a majority's ability
to properly manage the corporation. 62 In a quick response just one
year later, Massachusetts acknowledged that it may have gone too
N.E.2d 1112, 1117 n.13 (1986).
56 See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 519.
17 Id. at 508, n.458Id. at 514.
59 id.
60 Id. at 515.
61 Thomas P. Billings, Remedies for the Aggrieved Shareholder in a Close
Corporation, 81 MAss. L. REv. 3, 5 (1996).
62 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 247 (noting that "courts
have found the equal opportunity rule... impossible to administer"); see also
Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642 (Md. 1985); Sundberg v.
Lampert Lumber Co., 390 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). But see Jones v.
H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969) (holding in California prior to
Donahue that majority shareholders breach their fiduciary duty by creating a
market for their stock that was not made accessible to the minority
shareholders); James D. Cox, Mergers and Acquisitions: Equal Treatment for
Shareholders: An Essay, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 615 (1997) (defending the
application of the equal opportunity doctrine).
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far and scaled back its Donahue holding.63 In Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc.,64 the court held that the majority shareholder
may still not treat the minority unfairly, but it will be considered to
have fulfilled its fiduciary duty to the minority when (1) it shows
that it acted in pursuit of a legitimate business purpose and (2) the
minority shareholder cannot demonstrate that this purpose could be
accomplished in an alternative manner less detrimental to the
minority's interests. 65 The burden of demonstrating a legitimate
purpose falls on the defendant majority shareholders and, if they
are successful, the burden of demonstrating a less harmful
alternative falls on the minority.66 The Wilkes court noted
retrospectively that "[t]he majority, concededly, have certain rights
to what has been termed 'selfish ownership' in the corporation
which should be balanced against the concept of their fiduciary
obligation to the minority." 7 Massachusetts courts have
reinforced the holding and application of the Wilkes standard in
several subsequent cases, 68 clarifying that the duty is not just from
the majority to the minority but the converse as well.69 Much of
63 Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
While many consider the Wilkes decision to be a scaling back, others see it as
more of a clarification rather than a retreat. See, e.g., O'NEAL, supra note 17, at
7-36 (commenting that in Wilkes "the Massachusetts court added depth and
bounds to its Donahue pronouncements").
64 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).651 d. at 663.66 See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 17, at 7-37. O'Neal and Thompson
note that,
[w]hen a minority shareholder challenges majority action as a
breach of fiduciary duty, the court should ask if the controlling
group can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its
actions and if the answer is affirmative, give the minority an
opportunity to demonstrate that the same legitimate objective
could have been achieved through an alternative course of
action less harmful to the minority's interest.
Id.
67 id.
68 See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849 (1988); Smith v. Atlantic
Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981). But see Hunt v. Data Management
Resources, Inc., 985 P.2d 730, 732 (Kan. 1999) (holding that a shareholder may
act in a self-interested manner without the burden of strict fiduciary duties).
69 See, e.g., A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Chesterton, 128 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997)
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the growing nationwide judicial recognition of fiduciary duties
held by one shareholder to another in a close corporation can be
traced back to some initial grounding in the standard set forth by
Donahue and amended by Wilkes.7 °
Commentators sometimes refer to Massachusetts' rule as
the "majority perspective rule," since it assesses the fairness of a
majority shareholder's actions by looking at the facts from the
majority's perspective.71 In other words, Massachusetts, and the
states which follow its lead, first ask "whether the majority has
pursued legitimate goals rather than whether the majority's
conduct has had an unfair impact upon the minority's
investments." 72 Interestingly, both New York and California
courts have adopted a countervailing "minority perspective rule"
which assesses fairness from the minority's perspective. The
minority perspective rule could be construed as favorable to the
minority's claims and more understanding of its "trapped"
disadvantageous position. Delaware, arguably the most influential
of the jurisdictions covered here, has expressly declined to
recognize any direct fiduciary duty held by majority shareholders
toward minority shareholders. However, some commentators have
suggested that other aspects of Delaware's mature corporate
common law provide functionally equivalent protection to
minority shareholders. 73 Each variant is addressed in turn below.
(affirming a judgment against a minority shareholder who attempted to create a
liquid market for his stock that was not accessible to all shareholders of the
corporation); Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849, 853-54 (Mass. 1998);
Smith v. Atl Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 801-02 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
70 See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 17, at § 9.21 ("Differences as to the
scope and meaning of the fiduciary duties under a Donahue standard do not
detract from its widespread acceptance.").
71 See Ragazzo, supra note 19, at 1105; Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder
Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective,
53 VAND. L. REv. 749, 763 (2000) (noting that "the [Massachusetts] court's
language echoed the majority perspective's emphasis on preserving the
controlling shareholder's decision-making discretion").
72 Ragazzo, supra note 19, at 1105.
73 See, e.g., id. at 1135 ("[E]ven if the Delaware Supreme Court stands firm in
its refusal to create special rules for closely held corporations, there is no reason
the Delaware courts cannot employ Delaware's general law on the fiduciary
duties of majority shareholders to prevent [overly dilutive events] in closely held
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C. The Oppression Doctrine in New York and
California-the Minority Shareholder Perspective
While the majority perspective pioneered by Massachusetts
is credited as the first to formally recognize the need to protect the
special vulnerabilities of minority shareholders in close
corporations, it is quickly losing its position as the leading state
rule. The minority perspective variant, led by the courts of New
York,74 has been rapidly adopted by most states seeking to provide
redress for aggrieved minority shareholders in close corporations. 75
The minority perspective rule focuses the analysis not on
the nature or intention of majority shareholder conduct, but on the
consequential impact that such conduct has on minority
shareholders. This rule emphasizes protection of the minority
interest rather than punishment of the majority's behavior, and
typically employs a "reasonable expectations" approach to
determine whether the expectations of the minority have been
materially frustrated by the majority's actions.76 "Indeed, in
describing the reasonable expectations standard, the New York
Court of Appeals focused primarily on the harm to minority
shareholders that potentially results from majority action." 77
corporations.").
74 The first and most commonly cited case articulating the minority perspective
variant of the oppression doctrine in New York was In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc.,
473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984).
75 See McCallum v. Rosen's Diversified, Inc., 153 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 1998)
(applying Minnesota law); Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985);
Machmeier v. Southside Press, Ltd., 435 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988);
Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019 (N.J. 1993); McCauley v. Tom McCauley
& Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307
S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W. 2d 383 (N.D. 1987);
Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Masinter v. Webco Co.,
262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980).76 See Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders'
Reasonable Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 219-20 (1988) ("The
increasing use of the reasonable expectations standard reflects a move away
from an exclusive search for egregious conduct by those in control of the
enterprise and toward greater consideration of the effect of conduct on the
complaining shareholder, even if no egregious conduct by controllers can be
shown.").
77 See Moll, supra note 20, at 764.
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Focusing scrutiny on the expectations of the minority rather
than the actions of the majority marks a significant change in the
assessment process, essentially removing the legitimacy of the
majority's actions from the inquiry.78 New Jersey's highest court
has noted that "[flocusing on the harm to the minority shareholder
reflects a departure from the traditional focus, which was solely on
the wrongdoing by those in control, and reflects the current trend
of recognizing the special nature of close corporations."
79
Accordingly, this test places critical analysis on the "reasonable
expectations" of the minority shareholders, arguably a less than
perfect analysis. In setting forth the original rule, the New York
court in Kemp tried to provide the following guidance:
[m]ajority conduct should not be deemed oppressive
simply because the petitioner's subjective hopes and
desires in joining the venture are not fulfilled ....
Rather, oppression should be deemed to arise only
when the majority conduct substantially defeats
expectations that, objectively viewed, were both
reasonable under the circumstances and were
central to the minority's decision to join the
venture.
80
The objective standard set forth in Kemp does not require an
explicit document setting forth an articulation of the minority's
expectations, but rather requires only that the majority
shareholders were aware, or should have been aware, of the
relevant expectations given the particular circumstances of the
81
situation. Moreover, while most jurisdictions measure a minority
shareholder's expectations as of the time of such shareholder's
78 See Ragazzo, supra note 19, at 1106 ("According to [the minority perspective]
view, the legitimacy of the majority's purposes is irrelevant if the minority is
denied something for which it bargained, explicitly or implicitly, at the time of
investment.").79 See Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1029 (N.J. 1993).
8o In re Judicial Dissolution of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179
(N.Y. 1984); see also Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C.
1983) (holding that "[i]n order for plaintiff's expectations to be reasonable, they
must be known to or assumed by the other shareholders and concurred in by
them").
81 See Kemp, 473 N.E.2d 1173.
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initial investment, some courts and commentators have suggested
that this expectation may properly evolve over time following the
investment.
82
California's minority oppression doctrine was outlined by
its Supreme Court in Jones v. HF. Ahmanson & Co. 83 The court
made plain the explicit recognition of a duty owed by majority
shareholders. "The rule of corporation law.., is well settled ....
The majority has the right to control; but when it does so, it
occupies a fiduciary relation toward the minority, as much so as
the corporation itself or its officers and directors." 84 California
seems to follow a hybrid rule, lying somewhere between
Massachusetts' majority perspective and New York's minority
perspective. California appears to approach the issue of a fiduciary
breach by looking at the minority's treatment and whether it has
been fair, suggesting a minority-centered view.85 However, in
addition to considering the minority's treatment, California will
also look at whether the actions taken by the majority shareholders
were in genuine pursuit of a proper corporate purpose.8 6
The California case and eventual settlement involving a
company called Alantec Inc. involved facts where two minority
shareholders received treatment that was decidedly and objectively
82 See, e.g., A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Chesterton, 128 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997);
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.S. 1983); O'NEAL & THOMPSON,
supra note 22, § 9.30, at 143 (noting that "[t]he relevant expectations are those
that exist at the inception of the enterprise, and as they develop thereafter
through a course of dealing concurred in by all shareholders"). Professor
O'Neal has conceded, however, that the court's focus should be on the
"participants' original business bargain [because] the most significant
bargaining occurs at the initial stage of the enterprise." See id. at 91.83 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969); see also Stephenson v. Drever, 947 P.2d 1301 (Cal.
1997).84 Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 473 (Cal. 1969).
85 See id. at 472 (noting that the rule in California is one of "inherent fairness
from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein").
86 See id. at 471 (recognizing that majority shareholders have "the right to
dissolve the corporation to protect their investment if no alternative means were
available" and requiring that "no advantage was secured over other
shareholders"); see also 2 H. Marsh, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW &
PRACTICE § 11.46, at 958-60 (3d ed. 1995).
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unfair.87 Founded in 1987, Alantec completed several venture
capital rounds over a four year period that diluted the initial
investors' holdings down to eight percent of the company while the
venture capitalists owned the remaining 92%.88 With control of
the company, the VCs engineered a financing round with terms
that diluted the minority shareholders from eight percent down to
0.007%. Not long after this dilutive event, the company went
public and was subsequently sold for $770 million. Had the
minority shareholders retained their eight percent position, they
would have garnered over $40 million, but were left with only
approximately $500,000 after the dilutive financing event. During
the trial's preliminary motions, plaintiffs counsel argued that the
majority shareholders acted solely in pursuit of their personal gain
at the minority's expense, at times doing so in bad faith.89 The
presence of both unfair treatment and a lack of proper business
purpose put the venture capital defendants in a difficult position,
forcing them to settle for $15 million soon after their motion for
summary judgment was denied.90 Similar settlements have been
reached more recently. The founder of a company called Nishan
Systems filed suit against several prominent investors, including
Lightspeed Ventures and ComVentures, claiming that the investors
engaged in transactions that significantly diluted the founder's
return upon the company's sale for $85 million in 2003. The
founder received $800,000 as a result of the sale, and sued for an
undisclosed greater sum. The dispute settled in February 2005,
and while specifics were not disclosed, press coverage of the
settlement suggested the receipt of a substantial payment to the
plaintiff.91 A similar suit brought by the founders of Epinions.com
is pending against Benchmark Capital, August Capital, and BV
Capital, all significant pillars of the venture capital community.92
87 See Kalashian v. Advent VI Limited Partnership, Case No. CV739278 (Sup.
Ct. Santa Clara Co. filed Mar. 23, 1994); see also Scott Herhold, Venture
Capitalists Settle Suit, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEws, Feb. 20, 1997, at 1 C
(covering the Alantec settlement).
88 See Herhold, supra note 87.
89 See id.
90 See id.
9' See Loizos, supra note 16.
92 Id.
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Venture capitalists conducting business in a minority
perspective jurisdiction must be particularly careful, since liability
may be assessed even while acting with good intentions. So long
as a minority holder shows that his investment expectations were
reasonable and frustrated by the majority's actions, the majority
will be held to have breached its duty. Of notable importance is
the courts' use of a constructive knowledge standard in assessing
whether the majority was aware of the minority's expectation, thus
helping it satisfy the definition of "reasonable." The objective
nature of the test may spur majority shareholders into conducting
some minimum investigation into the minority's expectations prior
to embarking upon a potentially oppressive action. 93
D. The Oppression Doctrine in Delaware-Still
Undetermined
1. Delaware's View on the Majority Oppression
Doctrine
The Delaware Court of Chancery first faced a case
involving a freezeout of a minority shareholder's position in Litle
v. Waters.94 The plaintiff in Litle, who owned one-third of the
stock versus the defendant's two-thirds, alleged that the majority
shareholder's suppression of dividend payments rendered his stock
worthless as part of a freezeout scheme. 95 In finding for the
plaintiff, the court held that a close corporation majority
shareholder has a fiduciary duty of fairness to a minority
shareholder that precludes the use of freezout tactics. Moreover,
the Chancery Court applied New York's minority perspective
version of the oppression doctrine to find that a majority
shareholder breaches its fiduciary duty if it frustrates the
reasonable investment expectations of the minority, irrespective of
93 See infra Part VI.A for a discussion of managing minority shareholder
expectations preemptively as both a sanitizing action for the company and a
layer of liability protection for venture capital firms upon entering a deal.
94 No. 12155, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 25 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 1992).
9' See id. at *5.
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the majority's intentions or ambitions.96
A year after Litle, the Delaware Supreme Court decided the
case of Nixon v. Blackwell, where it first considered the question of
"[w]hether there should be any special, judicially-created rules to
'protect' minority stockholders of closely held Delaware
corporations." 97 The case involved a corporate practice of buying
key man life insurance policies for executive employees and using
the proceeds paid upon the death of an employee to buy back the
employee's stock from the estate. The non-employee minority
shareholders had no such means of liquidity for their stock upon
death or otherwise, and claimed that the policy unfairly provided a
liquidity benefit for the employee shareholders that was
unavailable to non-employee shareholders. 98 The Chancery Court,
in deference to the equal opportunity principle set forth in
Donahue v. Rodd. Electrotype Co.,99 held that this practice
constituted discrimination and that the majority shareholders
breached their fiduciary duty through its implementation.' 
00
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court overturned the
Chancery Court's ruling, and added emphatic language to reject
the notion of an oppression doctrine to protect minority
shareholders in Delaware close corporations.10' The court cited
Delaware's legislation that enables close corporation shareholders
to govern their relationships by contract,' °2 and postulated that any
shareholder protection should be sought through private contract
negotiation and not by judicial intervention.103
Delaware's hard stand on this issue has sparked some
caustic debate. 104 In many cases involving traditional close
96 See id. at *22 (citing Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017 (1984)).
97 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993).
98 See id. at 1376-77.
99 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
'
00 See Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1373.
101 See id. at 1379.
102 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-356 (1998). The Delaware statute
explicitly permits close corporation shareholder agreements that limit a board's
discretion and function, effectively providing for the company's management
directly by the shareholders. See id. §§ 350-351.
103 See Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1380.
'04 See Ragazzo, supra note 19, at 1311; Robert B. Thompson, The Taming of
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corporations, the suggestion that minority shareholders can and
should protect themselves by contract is a plausible position.
However, in the venture start-up context, angel investors encounter
significant limitations on their ability to do so.' 0 5 Some
commentators claim that it is unrealistic to expect minority
shareholders to adequately protect themselves in a close
corporation context. 10 6 Others, grounded generally in equitable
and public policy concerns, note that "[i]t would seem to be the
courts' job to... enforce the spirit of the deal between the parties,
even in cases where no formal contract exists."' 0 7 Still others,
recognizing that close corporation minority shareholders may
consider the costs of retaining preventative legal counsel to be
prohibitively expensive, argue that courts should focus their
inquiry on "what the parties would have contracted for had
transaction costs been nil."' 0 8 It has also been noted that the Nixon
appeal did not directly involve a freezeout scheme or other issue of
minority shareholder oppression, couching all language against
Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 921, 935 (1995).
105 See Manuel A. Utset, A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete
Contracting: The Case of Shareholder Contracts, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 1329,
1335 (2003) ("[A] minority shareholder who is fully informed of applicable
legal rules, is not overly trusting, and has a strict preference to enter into
shareholder contracts, may still fail to do so due to self-control problems [based
on] fairly straightforward human motivations."); F. Hodge O'Neal, Close
Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAW
873 (1978); F. Hodge O'Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Protecting
Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 121 (1987).
106 See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 17, § 2.20, at 54 (recognizing "[t]he
widespread reluctance of the participants in small businesses to obtain
competent legal advice").
107 Ragazzo, supra note 19, at 1311.
108 See EASTERBROOK AND RISCHEL, supra note 18, at 250. Judge Easterbrook
and Professor Rischel also note that
[r]ules bite most frequently... when parties are ignorant of
them until a dispute arises; then they are bound by whatever
the standard term happens to be. Many commentators believe
that such ignorance is widespread and that the law of closely
held corporations is defective because it fails to protect
investors who neglect to protect themselves.
Id. at 237.
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minority shareholder protections in non-binding dicta. °9 In short,
the Nixon court's assertion that contract terms should be the only
means of minority shareholder protection in close corporations has
not been formally resolved, and remains subject to serious
debate." 0
The only other Delaware case involving a claim of breach
of duty by a close corporation's majority shareholders was in
Riblet Products v. Nagy, decided in 1996.111 That case involved
the enforcement of an executive shareholder's employment
agreement where the executive claimed that the company's
controlling shareholders breached their fiduciary duty by failing to
uphold their obligations in his agreement.1 2 The case was brought
in federal court in Indiana, which held that the majority
shareholders had breached their duty and imposed upon them
$375,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, the question certified
by the Seventh Circuit was "whether corporate law requires
controlling shareholders to act as fiduciaries toward minority
shareholder-employees."" 13 The circuit court deemed that Indiana,
following Massachusetts' majority perspective version of the
oppression doctrine set forth in Wilkes, would recognize such a
fiduciary dut and would likely find that it had been violated in the
Nagy case. 11 The case was governed by Delaware law, however,
and the Seventh Circuit certified the question for review by the
Delaware Supreme Court, noting that "[t]he Supreme Court of
Delaware has never addressed the question."' 1 5
109 The Nixon case as appealed did not include the claim that the majority had
utilized a freezeout scheme to force the minority's sale of its shares at a low
price, even though those facts were involved in the lower court case.
110 See Hollis v. Hill, 232 F.3d 460, 469 n.28 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he Delaware
Supreme Court has yet to consider the precise issue in this case, namely whether
a controlling shareholder is liable for actions taken with the purpose and effect
of freezing out another shareholder.").
... 683 A.2d 37 (Del. 1996). But see Clemmer v. Cullinane et al., 2002 WL
1923868, at 3 (Mass. Super.) ("[T]he Delaware Supreme Court in Nixon has
specifically addressed the minority shareholder freezeout claim indicating that it
is not a new theory of liability and will not ultimately prevail.").
112 Nagy v. Riblet Prods. Corp., 79 F.3d 572, 573-74 (7th Cir. 1996).
113 See id. at 576.
114 See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
"' Nagy, 79 F.3d at 577. The fact that the Seventh Circuit didn't reference
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When the Delaware court accepted the certification for
Nagy, it reformulated the certified question narrowly, limiting its
analysis to "[w]hether majority stockholders of a Delaware
corporation may be held liable for violation of a fiduciary duty to a
minority stockholder who is an employee of the corporation under
an employment contract with respect to issues involving that
employment.,,116 The Delaware court took advantage of this
reformulated limited context addressing employment contract
issues, noting the relatively lengthy extent to which the contested
terms were negotiated in the agreement, and finding that in such a
case where a detailed contract exists addressing the issues directly,
the contract terms would apply and there is no cause for the courts
to impose any fiduciary duty on the majority shareholders. 117 The
court took some pains to avoid the direct question of whether a
duty is owed among and between close corporation shareholders in
the Nagy case, consequently leaving the issue of majority
shareholder fiduciary duty unresolved to this day.
2. Application of Delaware's Entire Fairness
Test
Even in the event that Delaware would refuse to impose
any fiduciary duty upon a close corporation's majority shareholder
via any version of the minority oppression doctrine, an angel
investor plaintiff may still be able to impose the same standard of
responsibility through different means. Directors of Delaware
corporations are, of course, bound to maintain the minimum
standards of the jurisdiction's oft-cited duties of care and loyalty.
The duty of care considers such factors as whether directors acted
Nixon strongly suggests its endorsement of the view that Delaware's law has not
yet weighed in on the question of shareholder oppression in close corporations.
The court cited Ueltzhoffer v. Fox Fire Development Co., No. 9871, 1991 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 204 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 1991), as the only relevant Delaware
authority. Ueltzhoffer, as noted by the court, does not resolve the issue of
whether Delaware recognizes a fiduciary duty owed by shareholders in close
corporations.
116 Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 39 (Del. 1996).
117 See Nagy, 79 F.3d at 577 (declaring that "the label 'fiduciary' does not trump
a real contract; it is a gap-filling approach").
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in a manner that was informed, in good faith, and in the belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.118 The
duty of loyalty "is intended to prevent a director from taking action
that would accrue to the advantage of himself or herself personally
(or a separate third party) at the expense of, or to the detriment of,
the corporation and its shareholders." ' 19 A court looks for any
conflicts of interest that may arise between a director's self-interest
and duties to the company, and is particularly wary of any
transactions between the company and a separate firm in which the
director has a direct financial interest, such as a venture capital
firm.' 2 ' So long as these duties are met, directors will enjoy the
liability protection granted by the business judgment rule to shield
a board's business decisions from the second-guessing scrutiny of
a court with the benefit of hindsight.' 22 Should either duty not be
met, and some have suggested that the duty of loyalty can never be
properly fulfilled in the context of a venture capital start-up
company, 123 a Delaware court will apply its "entire fairness" test to
the actions of a board, resting the burden on the board to prove that
a given company action was fair to all shareholders. 124 Meeting
118 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (noting that the
business judgment rule stems from the principle and presumption that a
company's directors are the ultimate managers of the company's business
affairs).
119 Matthew P. Quilter, et al., supra note 45, at 1107-08.
120 See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
121 See id. at 1108.
122 See id. at 872 (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971)
in asserting that, if the business judgment rule applies, a Delaware court "will
not substitute its own notions of what is or is not sound business judgment").123 See Bartlett & Garlitz, supra note 7, at 617-20 (enumerating several claims
of independence by venture capital start-up company directors and explaining
why each is unconvincing).
124 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). The Delaware
legislature has created a safe harbor provision enumerating certain steps an
interested director may take to mitigate the appearance of impropriety. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144(a)(1)-(3) (2001). However, even if a director were to
follow the statute and undertake to satisfy the safe harbor, Delaware courts have
not absolved liability but rather view satisfaction of the safe harbor as a
mitigation of concern that "merely removes an 'interested director' cloud...
[but] nothing in the statute ... removes the transaction from judicial scrutiny."
Flieger v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976). In most cases, if a party
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this burden is notoriously difficult in Delaware courts, leading
many to consider the invocation of the entire fairness test as an all
but dispositive outcome in favor of the plaintiff.'25
In most corporations, shareholders are numerous and
widely dispersed, with even relatively large shareholders owning
only a small fraction of the company's outstanding stock. Though
such large shareholders may wield some influence of the
company's affairs, absent separate contractual or voting
arrangements, that influence does not approach any material level
of control. This is the case in most public corporations, resulting
in a concentration of corporate control in the hands of the elected
directors acting as representatives of a wide shareholder base. It is
proper, in this large public company model, for the fiduciary
responsibilities described above to rest with the company's direct
managers-its board of directors.
However, courts have noted that where there is one large
controlling shareholder or a block of shareholders constituting a
majority, the majority shareholders are "generally subject to many
of the same fiduciary obligations as a director, because the
shareholder may control the directors." '126 This fiduciary duty
inures to majority shareholders in both public and private
companies, though it is more likely to be implicated in smaller
private companies where the shareholder base is smaller and a
controlling shareholder's control is more evident. The U.S.
Supreme Court has specifically noted that "[t]he majority has the
right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary relation
meets the safe harbor qualifications, the most a Delaware court will do is shift
the burden to the party challenging a board's alleged self-dealing action, leaving
it to the plaintiff to prove that the action was unfair. See Kahn v. Lynch
Communications Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (1994).
125 See, e.g., Ragazzo, supra note 19, at 1137 (suggesting that the application of
the entire fairness test borders on "outcome-determinative"); Mills Acquisition
Co. v. MacMillan, Inc. 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1988); AC Acquisitions v.
Anderson, 519 A. 2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
126 WILLI E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS, § 1.13 (7th ed.); see, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306
(1939) (declaring that [a] director is a fiduciary, ... [as] is a dominant or
controlling stockholder or group of stockholders"); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.
2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955); Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U.S. 50 (1890);
Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1991).
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toward the minority, as much so as the corporation itself or its
officers and directors.' 27 With their substantial control, majority
shareholders step into the shoes of the directors and bear the same
set of responsibilities as would directors. As one commentator put
it,
[a]lthough the traditional corporate model posits
that directors, rather than shareholders, direct
corporate activity, this model breaks down where a
single shareholder or group of shareholders owns a
controlling interest. In such situations, the board is
usually just a proxy for the controlling shareholder
or group. The power incident to control gives rise
to equivalent responsibility.'
28
Accordingly, even if the Delaware Supreme Court does eventually
spell out its stance against an oppression doctrine set forth in
Nixon, majority shareholders with de facto control of a board could
nonetheless serve as an extension of a board of directors of a
Delaware corporation and accordingly bear the same fiduciary
responsibilities.
In sum, although Delaware's Nixon court suggested its
aversion to imposing an explicit fiduciary protection for minority
shareholders in close corporations, that position has yet to be
couched as a binding precedent in a case directly addressing the
issue. The view has also received significant comment and
criticism, causing Delaware to soften its view and defer a firm
decision through its opinion in Nagy, which goes so far as to
suggest that Delaware law may protect minority shareholders in
freezeout cases. Irrespective of how Delaware's minority
oppression doctrine may be settled, there exist today the duties of
care and loyalty owed by both directors and controlling
shareholders of public and private Delaware corporations. To the
extent the duty of loyalty cannot be satisfied, a likely result for VC
127 Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919).
128 See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 126, at § 1.13 ("When minority
shareholders have no voice in management, the majority shareholders have a
duty to protect the interests of the minority."); River Management Corp. v.
Lodge Properties, Inc. 829 P.2d 398 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Ragazzo, supra note
19, at 1135.
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investors in start-up companies, 129 a Delaware court will apply its
entire fairness test to a challenged transaction, possibly resulting in
the provision of the same protection to the aggrieved minority
shareholders as would a formal recognition of special majority
shareholder fiduciary duties, albeit via a different analytical route.
IV. The Angel's Unique Role in VC Start-ups
Angel investors are a rare and courageous breed. In many
cases, they are the beneficent providers of a new company's initial
capital that is the launch pad of the new venture. Angels enter a
deal at the inception stage usually for at least one of the following
four reasons: (1) they have a pre-existing relationship with the
company's founders toward whom they likely feel a positive
bias; 30 (2) they get excited about the promise of a company's
technology and want to be a part of its commercialization; (3) they
like the perceived economics of investing at the "ground floor" of
an enterprise with the hopes of buying low and selling at a high
multiple; or (4) once VCs get involved with a company at a
slightly later stage of its life, it is unlikely that the VCs will tolerate
the expansion of a company's shareholder base to include an angel,
thus limiting an angel's investment opportunities to those that a
VC would decline as being "too early." Each of these reasons are
problematic in their own right, implicating the angel's expectations
or vulnerability to abuse in a manner that is relevant to a court's
analysis of their deserved protection.
129 See Quilter et al., supra note 45, at 1120. Quilter notes that
[t]he potential for the venture fund to obtain rights and
benefits above and beyond those that would have been
achieved in an arm's length negotiation presents a stark
conflict of interest dilemma for the venture capitalist board
representative: he or she is bound by a fiduciary duty of
loyalty to the company, yet is faced with the prospect of
helping to structure and approve a financing in which the
venture fund he or she represents may ultimately accrue
excess profits at the expense of the company and its
shareholders.
Id.
130 Sometimes an angel financing round is referred to as a "friends and family
round."
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Sophisticated angels try to invest in the same security as
venture investors, creating and purchasing a preferred series of
stock with certain rights and return benefits senior to the common
stock. Some very seasoned angels, or at least angels represented
by seasoned counsel, will invest in a convertible note with
principal and interest convertible into the company's subsequent
preferred equity round. This method benefits the angel for a
number of reasons: it grants a security interest in the company's
assets, defers the valuation negotiation, and piggybacks off of the
negotiating leverage of the VC by essentially pre-buying into the
venture round's series of stock. At the other extreme are angels
who purchase common stock, or "founders stock," which carries
no benefits other than a residual value that is likely to be
significantly diluted during the course of a company's life.131
Whichever method of investment used, angel investors are
susceptible to actions and potential abuse by venture capital
investors, even when such "abuse" is not intentionally directed
toward the angels and is in perfect compliance with the VC's
mandate to serve its limited partner ("LP") investor base.' 32 This
Part describes some of the reasons for an angel's unique
susceptibility, setting the stage for a claim of minority shareholder
oppression against the larger VC shareholder.
13 1 Typically, all venture capital investors in a start-up will negotiate to purchase
preferred stock. The only common stock will be held by the company's
founders, any consultants or professionals paid with stock along the way, and a
pool of common shares reserved for issuance upon the exercise of options held
by the company's employees (often called the "option pool"). An option pool is
needed to properly incent management and key employees to increase the value
of the stock so they can derive a profit upon the exercise of their vested options.
Option pools usually constitute between 15% and 30% of a company's fully
diluted capitalization and, importantly, are often "re-upped" after each financing
event to fend off any dilutive effects the financing may have. This keeps the
option pool at a consistent relative size, but often significantly dilutes the value
of the common stock held by others, including that held by unwary angels.
132 Investors in venture capital firms are often referred to as "LPs," an
abbreviation for limited partner which is the legal definition of an LP's
relationship to the venture capital fund. This article may refer to "LPs"
hereinafter.
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A. Angels Often Invest On Trust
Though angels generally satisfy the requirements of the
accredited investor definition promulgated by federal securities
laws, 133 rarely are they fluent in the distinct practice of venture
capital investing. 134 Angels are usually introduced to a start-up
investment opportunity through a personal relationship, sometimes
by family relation, and are accordingly driven to their investment
decision by factors beyond a pure return analysis.135 These rangefrom a sympathetic interest in helping a struggling entrepreneur get
off the ground to an enthusiastic inclination to readily accept
unduly optimistic financial projections. This notion is especially
true in cases where new companies issue securities pursuant to the
registration exemption in the SEC's Rule 504, which does not
demand much in the way of company information disclosure. 136
Moreover, angels generally place far too much comfort in
the presumed support of and alignment of interests with venture
capital investors. "[M]inority shareholders as a rule only seem to
have wittingly left themselves open to majority exploitation and
the consequent disaffection and disappointment of their
expectations."' 13 7 They commonly do not have a firm enough grasp
133 See Rule 501(a) of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501, promulgated by theSecurities and Exchange Commission pursuant to Section 2(15) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
134 See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 17, at § 9:01 (arguing that minority
shareholders invest in close corporations without a full understanding that "in
the absence of special protective arrangements, almost absolute control" is in the
hands of the majority shareholders).135 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1735, 1799-
1807 (2001).
136 See Rule 504 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504, promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to Section 3(b) of the Securities
Act of 1933; Utset, supra note 26, at 1333 (2003) ("[M]inority shareholders
generally fail to enter into shareholder contracts due to ignorance or overly
trusting behavior."); see also Edwin J. Bradley, An Analysis of The Model Close
Corporation Act and a Proposed Legislative Strategy, 10 J. CORP. L. 817
(1985).137 See Manuel A. Utset, supra note 26, at 1345 n.68 (noting that "the correct
explanation [for this exhibited behavior] is a naive complacency, an overly
trusting nature, bad legal advice or a blunder").
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on a company's financing requirements to reach an exit event,
particularly in the current financial climate, and underestimate both
the challenge and nature of raising subsequent financing. While a
substantial private equity brokerage or placement agent industry
exists, venture capital investors in start-up companies typically try
to avoid using them to keep transaction costs down. The VC and
its professional network then become the main source of new
investor candidates, putting the angel investors even further at their
mercy. 1
38
B. Angels Often Do Not Have Adequate Legal
Representation
In Nixon, the Delaware Supreme Court based much of its
resistance to upholding a fiduciary duty for the benefit of minority
shareholders on its faith that the minority shareholder should be
able to defend and protect its own rights through contract.1 39 No
additional judicial protection should be forthcoming, according to
this argument, where minority investors can protect themselves. In
theory, this argument properly restrains judicial activism,
suppresses an overly paternalistic position of the court over private
party business dealings, and better allows for freedom of contract
and negotiation. In general, such a hands-off approach makes for
sensible jurisprudence. In the VC start-up company context,
however, it has some troubling limitations.'
40
For many reasons, minority investors in close corporations,
138 See Jeffrey A. Blomberg, The Lurking Danger in Insider-Led Financings, 12
Bus. L. TODAY 55, at 55 (May/June 2003), ("These companies typically do not
retain an investment banker to locate financing. Instead, they rely on the
company's venture capitalist directors who often have the means to obtain
outside financing.").
139 See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993).
140 Ragazzo, supra note 19, at 1129 ("There are, nevertheless, significant
limitations on the minority's ability to protect itself by contract [in close
corporations]."); F. Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation
and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAW 873 (1978) (noting how minority
shareholders still need protection in addition to their ability to enter into
protective contracts since state statutes which permit such governance by
contract are not "self-executing").
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and angel investors in particular, are not able to get adequate legal
representation at the initial or later stages of their investments.
This is more the result of financial or negotiation realities than a
conscious choice. The smaller the enterprise, the larger the relative
cost of securing and properly utilizing sophisticated legal
representation. For example, a group of angel investors investing a
total of $500,000 into a nascent technology company, or defending
its investment position at the next VC investment stage, is often
unable to bear the same level of legal representation as a large
public company.
Even where an angel engages legal counsel at the point of
initial investment, that point is usually the last at which the angel
will consider itself an independent constituency. During the
subsequent rounds of venture capital financing, angels will often
look to borrow and "piggyback" upon the legal representation
provided by the round's "lead" investor. A lead investor is
typically the largest VC participant in a new financing round, and
is responsible for negotiating the terms and nature of the round
with the company. It is customary for other "follow on" VCs who
invest alongside the lead to rely on the lead's legal representation
as a proxy for all investors. 141 This is appropriate where VCs of a
like nature invest together in the same security. However, few
angels appreciate the misalignment of their investment interests
and those of the lead VC, both because of the nature of their
securities held and their ability to participate in later rounds, and
they leave themselves without proper legal representation.
For example, angel investors by their nature do not have
access to the amount of reserved capital that a large VC fund may,
and as such may be unable to defend its equity position through
subsequent financing stages. Notwithstanding this distinction,
VCs often arrange a company's financing so as to require
substantial additional investment at specified future development
milestones. Staging investment is a common method used by VCs
to minimize the amount of risk capital deployed until a company
grows through its more vulnerable phases. The angel investor
suffers dilution at each of these stages and his investment could be
141 Indeed, sometimes the lead investor's law firm is incorrectly referred to as
"investors' counsel."
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eventually washed away if the staging continues beyond the
angel's staying power. To force insider support of a company,
sometimes VCs will impose a "pay to play" provision in a given
investment round. Here, the VCs will force the company to offer a
certain amount of stock to current investors at a certain price. If
any investors do not participate to their full pro rata share of the
issuance, they suffer a penalty, usually resulting in some additional
dilution. 142 With less investment capital and weaker bargaining
power, angels are often the most susceptible to penalty by a pay to
play and usually suffer the greatest injury.
Angels also often hold common stock instead of, or in
addition to, preferred stock. Since angels invest in a company at
its inception, the first security they purchase is "founders stock," or
the same common stock held by founders at the time of the
company's launch. A VC will purchase some variant of preferred
stock when it first invests, followed by subsequent rounds of
preferred stock issuances at each financing stage. Thus, an angel
will hold both common and preferred stock while VCs will only
hold preferred stock. The different mix of securities held creates
an inherent conflict between VCs and angels, since most of the
terms VCs negotiate for in their preferred stock are, by definition,
at the expense of the return of the common stock. VCs will
generally protect some portion of the common stock as a reserved
pool for the exercise of employee options to keep employees
motivated, but there is no such protection granted to common stock
held by non-employees like angels. Consequently, an angel
relying on a lead VC investor to negotiate on behalf of his holdings
is negotiating against himself.
143
At other times, angel investors believe their interests are
aligned with those of the founders, as in the case where an angel
investor has purchased common stock, the same kind of security
142 See Watchmark Corp. v. ARGO Global Capital, LLC et. al., Del. Ch., C.A.
No. 71 I-N, Chandler, C. (Nov. 4, 2004) (validating the use of pay to play
dilutive provisions by holding that directors of a Delaware company did not
violate their fiduciary duties by approving a financing that employed such a
framework to force inside investor participation).
143 See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting For the Omelet to Set:
Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 IOWA
J. CORP. L. 913 (1999).
owned by the founders. An angel might reasonably believe that
since the founders share the same equity interests, that they will
adequately represent those interests when negotiating against the
VCs on behalf of the company. For many of the reasons cited
below, however, those interests are frequently not as aligned as
many angels would hope. In recognition of this, one commentator
has gone so far as to suggest that when an angel investor's interests
are not precisely aligned with those of a represented constituency
in a close corporation transaction, the company should4provide
independent counsel for the angel at its own expense.'
C. Angel Interests are Distinct From and Often
Adverse to Those of Founders
1. Founders Have Non-Pecuniary Interests
Founders of legitimate and credible start-up companies are
few and far between. These are often scientists or entrepreneurs
who have spent a substantial portion of their lives working toward
the development of a technology to serve as the platform of a start-
up company. Many founders are astonished and understandably
overwhelmed by all the attention they suddenly attract from
service providers and business executives the moment a VC begins
to take an interest in their lab project. Their flattery and
excitement is counterbalanced by a healthy dose of trepidation
once others begin to recognize, and fight for a piece of, the value
in their invention.
The emotion and hard work contributed by a founder to a
start-up's technology is a particularly special type of investment
that demands rewards beyond the mere pecuniary. Founders are
watching their life's work commercialized from vision to reality,
144 See Ragazzo, supra note 19, at 1139 ("Where the corporation's lawyer is also
in effect acting as the majority's counsel, however, the minority deserves to be
represented by an independent lawyer at the corporation's expense."); Ryan v.
Tad's Enterprises, Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 693 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("A desire to control
costs cannot relieve corporate fiduciaries from their duty to assure that the
interests of minority shareholders in a self-dealing transaction are adequately
protected."); Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App. 1988).
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and will often readily sacrifice their own interests (and those of
others) to keep their dream alive. 145 Consequently, if the company
is facing a down round or possibly a washout situation, founders
may acquiesce to draconian VC terms much sooner than their
angel investors, even if both shareholders own the same type of
securities. The founder simply has a greater emotional investment
in seeing the enterprise to fruition than the angel, and is willing to
sacrifice his return to get it. The unassuming angel follows suit
often relying in false comfort that his and the founders' interests
are aligned.
2. Founders Stock Earned by Less Return-
Sensitive "Sweat Equity"
Another significant distinction between angel and founder
interests lies in the consideration each paid for their stake in the
venture. Angels have, of course, purchased their equity with cash.
In return they receive an illiquid security with the potential for
significant value dilution. Should the company grow successfully
and exit at a sufficiently high value, an angel investor will measure
the success of his investment as a multiple of the initial cash
invested and, in turn, his internal rate of return. Founders, on the
other hand, usually do not pay anything in cash but rather earn
their ownership in the company through "sweat equity," or the
work they have put in to develop the company to the point of its
financing. A company's initial investors sometimes refer to the
value a founder has generated before any money is invested as a
company's "pre-money value."'
146
Founders who own stock earned by their sweat equity do
not calculate the same investment return as angels since their cash
investment in the company is zero. Accordingly, if a founder
receives anything from the company, it is a positive return.
Furthermore, since most founders begin and remain employed by
the companies they create, the salaries they earn and the
145 See Padilla, supra note 33, at 279 ("As founders, the company may be seen
as their 'baby' and would not want to see the company go bankrupt.").
146 See generally ALEX WILMERDING, TERM SHEETS & VALUATIONS: AN INSIDE
LOOK AT THE INTRICACIES OF TERM SHEETS & VALUATIONS (2001).
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employment prospects they have at the company serve as an
immediate return. Any actual return on their stock is certainly
welcome, but comes on top of the return they receive every day by
their mere employment. This fact causes a divergence of founder
interests from angel interests in at least two ways. First, once VCs
get involved in the company and generally impose significant
influence over a company's operations, a founder may worry about
his continued employment at the company. In the face of investors
who want to consummate a washout transaction, founders "are
largely at the mercy of the board of directors, [which is] composed
of a majority of directors designated by the investors.' 47
Accordingly, founders employed by the company are unlikely to
stand up for their and their angel investors' rights in a position
adversarial to their employer. Second, since founders are
generating a positive return on their investment from the first day
they draw a salary check, they are not as hungry for a return as is
an investor who has put in cash. 148 In VC slang, founders are
"playing with the house's money" from the first day, and are not
considered to have put any "skin in the game" by virtue of having
received stock they did not purchase with cash. They are less
sensitive to maximizing their return than an angel who is working
toward a targeted return multiple on actual invested cash, and may
therefore not be as staunch a negotiator on the angel's behalf.
147 Id. at 279.
148 Arguably, founders could be considered to have invested their opportunity
cost which they may be foregoing by working at the start-up company rather
than a possibly more lucrative alternative. This argument rests on the
assumption that founders accept a lower cash salary at the start-up in exchange
for their equity stake and its potential to rise dramatically in value. In reality,
however, this is not the case. Start-up cash salaries are usually competitive to
those at larger company counterparts, even with the additional equity potential
on top of the cash payments. Another argument suggests that founders are
suffering a higher degree ofjob instability at a start-up than at a larger company.
This has traditionally been true and may continue to be so to a lesser extent
today, but job instability and overseas job outsourcing is an increasingly
important issue at even the largest companies today. In short, few jobs can
legitimately be considered safe in today's economic climate.
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3. Angels Don't Have a Founder's Access to or
Influence Within the Company's Operations
At a company's earliest stages, founders and their angel
investors are generally working closely together side by side.
Employees are few, the investor group is small, dollars are
precious, and both groups feel bound by a common and worthy
sense of mission. As the enterprise grows, however, complications
arise. The angel investors may serve as the founders' confidant up
to and during the first institutional round, but once venture
capitalists are involved, the VCs will thereafter dictate the board
membership and information flow. Most start-up boards consist of
five or seven directors, nearly half of which are designated by the
VCs, one or two for management, and one or two for an outside
director, usually designated or approved by the VCs. Founders
generally retain a position as an officer of the company, usually as
chief technology officer or vice president of business development,
and accordingly have daily access to the company's information,
progress, and even board meeting activities.
Angel investors, on the other hand, are often considered
unnecessary to the company's future once the VCs get involved.
The angels have made their contribution by helping the company
get off the ground, but now that it is up and running, the VC's
substantially deeper pockets should be all that is needed to help the
company achieve its growth path. With the angel's decreasing
relevance as the company grows, and the founders' (and
company's) increasing reliance on the future assistance of the VC
investors, the angel begins to be less connected to and informed by
the company. A savvy angel may be able to negotiate a board
observer position to stay on top of the company's progress, but
most VCs like to keep their board meetings small and will resist.
The angel's influence on the company becomes diluted along with
its equity holdings, and the resulting forced divergence keeps the
angel investor less informed and less protected. Indeed, it is not
uncommon for a company to consider, negotiate, and consummate
significant transactions (such as a new stock issuance or divestiture
of assets) without the angel investors even being aware of the
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transaction until its completion. 149
D. Angel Abuse is Likely to Increase in Current
Economic Climate
While angel investing has been risky in the past, current
economic conditions have imposed certain incentives and realities
upon VC activity that could make things even harder for angels.
1. Longer Time to Exit
All investors in start-up companies do so with one goal in
mind-reaching an exit event that can provide some liquidity for
their initial investment. Exits are the only way VCs and angel
investors make money and generate a return on capital. Generally
speaking, there are only two main avenues for a positive exit event:
The company goes public or is acquired by another company.
Neither of these events is common in today's financial markets,
particularly for high risk technology companies of the sort in
which angels and VCs invest. The number of VC-backed
company IPOs has fallen dramatically from over 300 in 2000 to
only 24 in 2002, 29 in 2003, and improving to 93 in 2004.150
Mergers and acquisitions activity has experienced a similar
decline, falling from $68 billion paid for acquisitions of venture-
backed start-up companies in 2000 to only $7.8 billion paid for
acquisitions in 2002, $7.7 billion paid in 2003, improving to $15.1
billion in 2004.151
Hand in hand with the scarcity of exits comes the longer
time and limited window of opportunity for reaching an exit event
for a given company. In 1998, a start-up company needed to raise
about $20 million and wait just over two years, on average, to
149 For example, small shareholders in the start-up company AuctionWorks,
which included several angel investors, were not even aware that the company
had consummated a new preferred stock issuance that was dilutive to their
holdings until after the deal was completed in May of 2004.
150 See Press Release, NVCA, 2004 Venture-Backed IPO Activity Exceeded
Prior Three Years Combined (Jan. 3, 2005), available at www.nvca.org.
151 See Press Release, NVCA, Total Venture-Backed M&A Valuations Nearly
Doubled in 2004 (Feb. 8, 2005), available at www.nvca.org.
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reach a successful exit for its investors. In 2001, that average had
grown to $45 million and nearly five years, and by 2003, it took
nearly $60 million and six years to achieve a successful exit
event. 152 The additional funding and longer time to exit puts angel
investors in an increasingly weak position. Each successive round
of investment calls upon all investors, including the angels, to
invest more to defend their equity position all the way through to
exit. As individuals, angels do not have the staying power held by
the larger VC funds, particularly in the face of provisions such as
the "pay to play" mechanism described above.
2. Increasing Pressure on VC Performance
Venture capital is one of the most aggressive of asset
classes, and in the volatile markets since 2000, has been a
particularly difficult place to make money. In fact, VC fund
returns have been negative every year since 2000, posting an
abysmal average -13.7% internal rate of return ("IRR") for funds
raised in 1999 and 2000, -11.9% for funds raised in 2002, and an
even worse -35.2% for funds raised in 2003.153 In fact, a venture
capital fund raised in 2000 can demonstrate a -3.9% return and
claim to be one of the top quartile performing funds of that year. 154
These return figures are, of course, averages, and a further
inspection reveals a more disturbing trend. Top venture capital
firms, generally referred to as "top quartile funds," have performed
well during the last several years, in fact increasingly so during the
152 MPM Capital, Presentation to the Kaufman Fellowship Program at Babson
College (Nov. 5, 2004).
153 See Silicon Valley Bank, Venture Capital Update Q2 2004; Reyes, supra
note 5. IRR figures posted for venture capital funds raised during the most
recent two years are generally not considered valid due to the industry's "J-
Curve" return dynamic. Venture funds typically perform badly in the first two
years of existence simply because bad investments tend to fail quicker than good
investments succeed, weighing the back end of a fund's investment life with the
successes, and thus ideally creating a "J" shape in the fund's investment return
graph. Moreover, return figures for venture capital funds are derived from
relatively small sample sizes. Only a few venture capital firms, which are not
required to divulge performance data except to a few public investment vehicles
in select states, provide their performance data to accessible sources.
154 See Silicon Valley Bank, Venture Capital Update Q2 2004.
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volatile years of 2000 through 2004. Top quartile venture capital
funds have historically returned an average cumulative return of
16.2% versus a capital weighted average of only 3.9% for all
venture capital funds. 155 The remaining bottom 75% of funds, on
the other hand, have demonstrated significantly worse
performance. 156 Indeed, on average, the bottom 75% of venture
funds have actually never generated a positive return since 1980
when VC returns started to be tracked.1
57
The growing performance dichotomy between top quartile
funds and everyone else has not gone unnoticed by those who care
most about VC returns, namely the LP investors who invest in VC
funds. These LPs, typically pension or endowment funds that
allocate a portion of their investment assets to venture capital, are
under great pressure to generate returns quickly as the baby
boomer generation nears retirement. Limited partners believe that
only top quartile venture funds are worthy of their money, and seek
them out almost exclusively. 58 Venture capital firms know this,
and accordingly know that their continued existence is dependent
upon membership in the coveted top quartile designation. This
desperation for returns by VC funds, dramatically enhanced in
recent years, manifests itself in an increasingly aggressive
negotiating posture at the portfolio company level, usually to the
detriment of the angel investor. The only way a VC investor can
increase his return is by accordingly reducing the return of other
investors, the angel investor included. And with successful exits
becoming more and more rare, the frenzied desire for a VC to
make the most of a successful deal can become rabid, sometimes
leading to unethical behavior.159 In this state, a venture capitalist
155 See id.
156 See Reyes, supra note 5.
157 See id.
158 But see Grove Street Advisors, LLC, The Case for Investing with New and
Emerging Private Equity Fund Managers, June 2002, available at
http://www.grovestreetadvisors.com/news/gsa white_paper0 1 .pdf (arguing
that LP investors should allocate a portion of a portfolio to new private equity
funds without any track record, but noting that, over time, track record and
manager team longevity are among the most critical factors in making an
investment decision).
159 See the discussion of the Alantec lawsuit in Part III.C.
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may understandably be driven to an overly-aggressive posture
during a market period when desperation is high and angel
investors are vulnerable. At the end of the day, "[t]he 'primary
purpose' of the venture capital investor is to obtain more equity at
a lower price, a benefit to which they think they are entitled in
view of the issuer's circumstances at the time.'
160
3. Perverse Influences on Company Financing
Policy
In addition to the rational macroeconomic reasons
discussed above which lead to anti-angel VC behavior, there are
additional behavioral drivers that are often harder to explain and
certainly harder to anticipate. Sometimes there exist circumstances
unique to a particular VC investor that give that investor certain
motivations not necessarily in the best interests of the company as
a whole. For example, the average size of a venture capital fund
grew dramatically to nearly $250 million in 2001, up from its
historical average of approximately $70 million (to which the
average size reverted in 2004). 161 In fact, forty-six funds were
raised in 2001 in amounts larger than $1 billion. 162
Notwithstanding the bigger fund size, VCs must still adhere to
their LP investors' return demands, albeit with a much higher
absolute return threshold to meet. 63 With this kind of pressure
looming, VCs with large sums of money available will tend to
heap as much money as possible onto promising companies in an
attempt to maximize their bet. This could result in a start-up
company being forced to raise significantly more capital than it
needs, and thereby issue significantly more stock than it should, in
order to satisfy the particular needs of one or two large fund
investors. This turn of events is caused by the capital deployment
160 Bartlett & Garlitz, supra note 7, at 615.
161 Reyes, supra note 5.
162 See id.
163 For a simple but powerful example, a venture fund with a $1 billion size must
generate and return an additional $1 billion to its investors within five years just
to demonstrate a 14.4% IRR, well below the average 20.0% demanded by most
VC investors.
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demands of an investor rather than the capital expenditure needs of
the company, and could result in unnecessary but significant
dilution to an angel investor.
V. An Aggrieved Angel's Potential Claims
As the plight of angels becomes both more difficult and
more common, two likely phenomena following from the
discussion above, courts may be more likely to consider providing
them with legitimate protection. At the same time, the standards
for ascertaining the need for protection are changing, under both
the majority perspective and minority perspective methods. For
example, in Massachusetts, the ability for a minority shareholder
plaintiff to demonstrate a less harmful alternative to a washout
financing is becoming more difficult as fewer alternatives are
available. Likewise, jurisdictions such as New York and
California, which consider the minority shareholder's expectations
when investing, must also recognize that those expectations are
changing and, hopefully, becoming more conservative. In either
event, the application of these various standards has not yet been
sufficiently tested through litigation, most likely because the
incentive for parties to settle such suits is so great. 164 This Part
attempts to forecast how each jurisdiction's test would apply to
claims of an aggrieved angel investor who suffers through the
dilution of a washout financing only to watch the company
subsequently achieve a profitable exit event in which the angel can
no longer participate.
A. Application of Massachusetts Law
An angel investor with the opportunity to bring a case in
Massachusetts would do so only if the angel believes that (1) the
VCs cannot show that the dilutive action was in the furtherance of
164 Investors and entrepreneurs in the technology community are a close-knit
group, with each of the belief that continued participation in the industry
depends upon maintaining credibility and good relations with the other. Overt
disputes are rare, and a formal legal proceeding by a technology industry
participant might quickly brand someone with a costly litigious reputation.
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a legitimate business purpose or (2) if the VCs can show a
legitimate purpose, that the same legitimate purpose could have
been achieved through means less harmful to his and other
minority shareholder interests. Such is the manner in which a
Massachusetts court would likely apply the Wilkes balancing test
in this situation. Cases brought will likely have varied and distinct
circumstances upon which each fact-specific decision will rest.
The Wilkes balancing test accommodates this required flexibility,
and permits the court to seek and subsequently define exactly what
constitutes a legitimate business purpose or less harmful
alternative.
Certainly venture capitalists may be able to demonstrate
several legitimate business purposes for company actions that may
have the effect of diluting an angel investor's holdings. In cases
where a company is running low on cash and quickly approaching
a point of insolvency, issuing stock at an extremely reduced price
may be the company's only realistic alternative. The resulting
dilution to the angels, likely compounded by the triggering of the
venture capitalist's anti-dilution protection, is still preferable to
bankruptcy. Similarly, issuances of a company's stock to
employees or founders as consideration for services performed has
been deemed to be a legitimate purpose by courts and
commentators.
65
In Horton v. Benjamin,166 the Massachusetts Superior Court
found that the issuance of 22,225 shares of stock in Vital
Technologies, Inc. to defendants as consideration for past
performed services to the company was a legitimate business
purpose. The court properly considered several specific factors,
including the company's extremely low cash balance, the lack of
any provision in the company's charter or bylaws prohibiting
issuing cash in exchange for services, and the value of the stock as
compared to the value of the services provided. 67 In response, the
plaintiff angel investor could not convince the court of the
existence of a less harmful alternative, and the court found for the
165 See, e.g., Horton v. Benjamin, 1997 WL 778662 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 26
1997); Padilla, supra note 33, at 287.
166 See Horton, 1997 WL 778662.
167 See id. at 27-28.
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defendant. Importantly, the difficulty in identifying a less harmful
alternative was the result of the court's feeling that the issuance of
a relatively small amount of stock, resulting in a relatively small
level of dilution, was not particularly harmful to begin with. This
case, while finding for the defendant,' 68 does not necessarily
illustrate how a Massachusetts court would respond to a set of facts
in which the angel investors suffered real harm, such as in the
Alantec case described above. There, the minority shareholders
saw the value of their equity holdings reduced dramatically shortly
before the company's exit. Facts involving legitimate harm to
angels will likely sway a court's sympathy toward the plaintiff.
The degree of loss suffered by the minority shareholders certainly
played a role in the Alantec defendant's quick settlement.
With a relatively sparse history of case law to review, the
only clear forecast for these cases is that they will be fact driven.
It is plausible that Massachusetts courts may permit venture
capitalists to consummate a dilutive down round only when
absolutely necessary and no other alternative exists. The level of
diligence required of venture capital investors and company
executives to seek and identify any other possible source of capital
has not yet been tested in court, but may end up at a threshold
higher than most venture capitalists would like. For example, a
court may not consider two months of presentations to twenty
potential investors sufficient, and may require greater foresight and
breadth of search in order to claim that all reasonable alternatives
have been exhausted. This is particularly true in cases where a
company's current investors forego all potential new investors and
instead close an "insider round" at an internally set valuation. In
such a case, venture capital investors should take special care to tie
the inside round valuation to some objective benchmark such as a
third party offering price or fairness opinion. A subjective and
arbitrary inside round valuation, particularly with a down round
168 While holding generally that the defendants did not breach their duty by
issuing the additional stock, the court did hold defendants in breach by
approving a reorganization of the company from a joint venture into a limited
partnership claiming that "the same legitimate objective could have been
achieved through an alternative course of action less harmful to the minority's
interest." Id. at *28.
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anti-dilution triggering effect for the benefit of the participating
investors, will likely be viewed skeptically by a Massachusetts
court when considering less harmful alternatives.' 69 A court in
such a case would likely ask the participating venture capitalists to
defend their chosen valuation with an expectation of a
methodology beyond a subjective estimate.170 Accordingly, even
if Wilkes' first prong of legitimate purpose is satisfied by claiming
business exigency, the second prong of "least harmful alternative"
is open to wide interpretation.
B. Application of New York and California Law
The minority perspective view of minority shareholder
oppression focuses, of course, on the reasonable expectations of
the minority shareholder. A New York or California court, when
faced with an angel investor claiming a breach of duty by a
company's VC investors, would look to the reasonable
expectations of the angel investor at the time of his decision to
invest and then assess whether those expectations had been
wrongly frustrated. This is likely to be no easy task, especially in
light of the overly rosy media attention given to high-growth
technology start-ups and widely varying expectations of angel
investors as they enter a new venture.' Surely no court will grant
169 Indeed, commentators have suggested that a heightened level of scrutiny of
VC actions has become an automatic component of a court's analysis. See, e.g.,
Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Texas Close Corporations.
Majority Rule Isn't What it Used to Be, 1 HoUS. Bus. & TAX L.J. 12, at 20
("[T]he fact that courts applying the oppression doctrine are subjecting the
majority's actions to 'reasonable expectations' or 'burdensome, harsh, and
wrongful conduct' standards suggests that courts are requiring majority
shareholders to do more than merely articulate a rational business purpose for
their decisions.") (citing Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 801
(Mass. App. Ct. 1981)).
170 See Bartlett & Garlitz, supra note 7, at 618 ("[I]f the investors do elect to
invest, it is not clear why equity should not impose fair and reasonable
conditions on the pricing equations because in the final analysis the investors are
dealing with themselves (unless an independent board exists to negotiate an
arm's length trade).").
171 Indeed, while some angel investors invest solely for the prospect of financial
gain, many do so for other, higher reasons. Peter Cooper, an angel investor in
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any credence to an angel investor's expectation of a given
company's success or failure, since such is the risk undertaken by
all early stage investors. Rather, the notion of expectation here is
the preservation of an angel investor's opportunity to participate in
the success of a start-up company, should success be achieved.
While decisions will be rendered on a highly fact specific,
case-by-case basis, there are certain expectations held by angel
investors that courts will likely recognize in nearly all
circumstances. For example, angel investors likely do have an
objectively reasonable expectation at the outset of their investment
in a company that, if the company should perform and grow at a
reasonably consistent pace throughout its life up to and including a
positive exit event, the angel investor should expect to participate
in the success of that exit event. Any actions by a company's
venture capital investors to frustrate or lessen the angel's share of
that success will likely be considered a violation of that
expectation and a breach of fiduciary duty by a jurisdiction that
applies the minority perspective rule. Other reasonable
expectations of an angel investor may include an expectation to
receive comprehensive and accurate updates on a company's
development progress, either on a regular basis or at least upon
request. Less clear-cut but somewhat reasonable expectations of
an angel are that a VC investor (1) will strive to avoid unnecessary
dilution of a company's shareholder base whenever possible; (2)
will not encourage or endorse any overly-aggressive dilutive
events for their own benefit, or (3) will not force its own particular
interests on a company to the detriment of a company's best
the first transatlantic telegraph cable venture, noted that his investment decision
was driven by a desire for
the consummation of that great prophecy, that 'knowledge
shall cover the earth, as the waters cover the deep,' and with
that feeling I joined [the venture] in what then appeared to
most men a wild and visionary scheme .... But believing, as
I did, that it offered the possibility of a mighty power for the
good of the world, I embarked on it.
JOHN STEELE GORDON, A THREAD ACROSS THE OCEAN, WALTER & COMPANY,
at 40 (2002) (citing ISABELLA FIELD JUDSON, CYRUS W. FIELD: His LIFE AND
WoRK 62 (1896)).
N.C. J.L. & TECH. IVOT.. 6
interests as a whole;' 72 and (4) will not recapitalize or otherwise
alter a company's basic corporate structure unless absolutely
necessary.
In addition to the equitable concept of honoring an angel
investor's initial expectations, jurisdictions enforcing the minority
perspective rule may support their position based on sound
macroeconomic policy foundations. Angel investors fill an
important niche in the financial food chain that supports
technology commercialization in the U.S. economy. Many of the
country's greatest technology company success stories, including
Hewlett Packard, Cisco Systems, Microsoft, Apple Computer, and
others, began first with the receipt of angel financing before
gaining enough credibility and traction to attract an initial round of
institutional venture capital funding. Angels fill a finance vacuum
between a company's inception stage as little more than a
university laboratory experiment to something worthy of VC
funding once products and markets can be identified. It is not
unreasonable to suggest that some promising technologies may
never make it beyond the inception stage without the initial
investment role taken on by angel investors. Any increase to the
risks of such early stage investment activity, including risks
created by the potential frustration of an angel investor's
reasonable expectations, will inevitably make it harder for angels
to justify their investment activity, reducing or even ceasing it
altogether.
Some commentators argue that imposing a fiduciary duty
on majority shareholders to protect minority shareholders such as
angel investors stifles the free will of a corporation's electorate.1
74
172 This includes not forcing the company to raise more money than needed so a
big fund may put excess cash to work or forcing a company to accept a
premature acquisition offer at a low price just so a VC can claim credit for an
exit.
173 See Part VI infra, for a suggestion on how a VC may protect itself by forcing
an angel investor to identify, determine, and agree upon the boundaries of
"reasonable expectations."
174 See Padilla, supra note 33, at 306. Padilla notes that in the fast moving world
of technology start-ups,
directors and officers do not have time to worry about what is
and is not a shareholder interest. It is the viability of the
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This argument is short-sighted, and must be balanced against the
fearful prospect of suffocating angel investors out of the practice of
commercializing new technology, thus eliminating a critical
component of our economy's technology industry. Angel
investors should have some level of the comfort that their
reasonable expectations will be protected and that their potential to
realize an investment return is legitimate in order to justify their
investment. The alternative is to risk the loss of this important
investor class, which could inhibit the growth of promising start-up
companies and place a drag on the economy's innovation engine.
C. Application of Delaware Law
Much has been made over the Delaware Supreme Court's
language in Nixon explicitly rejecting the state's recognition of a
minority oppression doctrine in close corporations. In the years
since Nixon, however, the need for additional equitable protection
of minority shareholders has become more clear, and the laissez-
faire notion of reliance on contract and market forces has
weakened. At best, the application of a doctrine in Delaware to
protect the interests of angel investors when confronted by
oppressive venture capital behavior is unclear.
Even if explicitly rejected, however, aggrieved angels may
still have a viable claim in Delaware based on an extension to
controlling shareholders of a director's duty to the company's
shareholders. Since VC shareholders frequently exercise explicit
or de facto control over the board of portfolio companies, such
VCs may be vulnerable to a claim based on improper board
conduct. When challenged with such a claim, controlling VC
shareholders must demonstrate fulfillment of their duty of care and
loyalty just like any director on the board over which they hold
substantial influence.' 75 The duty of care is likely to be easily
company that is at stake. For this reason, controllers of an
enterprise should have the freedom to make decisions in the
best interests of the corporation as a whole.
Id.
175 See United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972) (noting that a majority
shareholder with influence and control of a company's board of directors may
N.C. J.L. & TECH. I'VOL. 6
satisfied in such cases, given the high interest level of such large
shareholders, but the duty of loyalty is more difficult to satisfy,
given the strong potential for conflicts of interest. "[T]he problem
of self-dealing (broadly understood) in a closely held corporation
is omnipresent."' 76 Conflicts are particularly likely in venture
capital start-up companies, where the large VC shareholders often
have close relationships with each other outside of the context of
the company at issue,' 77 and always hold fiduciary obligations to
their own individual investor base, which is increasingly insistent
that venture investors maximize their return.
178
Even in cases where VCs do not have explicit control of a
company through their ownership of 51% of the voting shares,'
79
control of the board,1 80 or other method, "VCs are, at least
arguably, in de facto control either because of their stock position,
their board seats, or, more importantly, because they control the
spigot; they sit on the company's lifeline, with the ability to turn it
on or off.' 18' The VC's need to serve its LPs while wielding
significant interest over its portfolio companies conflicts with and
not promote its personal interests at the expense of the minority shareholders).
176 Ragazzo, supra note 19, at 1146.
177 See Bartlett & Garlitz, supra note 7, at 601 ("[T]he venture capital
community is small and incestuous, with most managers knowing each other.").
178 See Bartlett & Garlitz, supra note 7, at 624 (noting that a typical washout or
similar type of financing transaction in a venture capital start-up that benefits
certain shareholders at the expense of others is "by definition.. .an insider
trade").
179 Preferred stock, most often the kind owned by venture capital investors,
usually votes with the common on an as-converted basis, sometimes at a
conversion rate that is better than 1:1.
180 In cases where a venture investor does not own greater than 51% of the
voting stock, the VC will often require that at least one board seat be filled at its
designation, and demand additional influence (through a veto right or some
other enhanced voting mechanism) at the board or shareholder level, over who
sits in the other board seats and for how long.
181 Bartlett & Garlitz, supra note 7, at 601. Even if a company is able to
generate investment interest from additional new investors beyond its current
VC shareholders, the company will likely need the approval of its current VC
base to issue any additional preferred stock (sometimes it will need approval
from each VC individually, each of which may have a veto right). This required
consent lets the current VCs dictate the terms of any new investment
transactions even if they don't participate.
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may undermine a VC's duty of loyalty to minority shareholders,
thus precluding the protections of the business judgment rule.'82
Even aside from the breach of duty, the inherently illiquid nature
of a start-up company's stock and its insulation from normal
market movements provides a separate reason for denying business
judgment protection. As Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel
explain, "[o]ne rationale for the business judgment rule is that
managers who make errors (and even those who engage in self-
dealing) are penalized by market forces while judges who make
errors are not .... If neither managers nor courts are disciplined
by markets, this justification has less force."' 83
Without business judgment rule protection, a Delaware
court might apply its entire fairness standard to analyze a VC's
actions. This puts the burden on the venture capitalist to prove that
a given transaction is fair to all of the company's shareholders.
Though arguably there are several ways for a Delaware court to
conduct such an analysis, it is not unreasonable to suggest that a
balancing test similar to Massachusetts' Wilkes standard may be
employed. The court would likely first look at the legitimacy of
the business purpose of a VC's action and, to the extent that such a
legitimate business purpose can be found, then consider the nature
of the harm inflicted on the angel investor and whether that harm
could have been avoided while serving the same business purpose.
The Illinois Court of Appeals recently undertook such an analysis
while applying Delaware law to a claim of minority shareholder
oppression. 84 The court recognized that a majority shareholder
group with substantial influence or control over the board of
directors owes a fiduciary responsibility to the minority
shareholders, and held that the necessity of the transaction did not
outweigh the harm caused to the minority. Thus, a logical
extension of director liability in Delaware draws majority
182 See Matthew P. Quilter et al., supra note 45, at 1121 (noting the inherent
conflict between a venture capitalist's duty to maximize its own returns while at
the same time protecting all stockholder interests, with a duty to "at all times
work in good faith to promote the best interests of the company and its
shareholders as a whole").
183 EASTE'RBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 243.
184See Feldheim v. Sims, 2003 Ill. App. LEXIS 908 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
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shareholders into a similar position of fiduciary responsibility as if
they were in Massachusetts.
VI. Steps Venture Capitalists Can Take to Protect
Themselves
This article has suggested that venture capital investors in
start-up companies may be vulnerable to claims from angel
investors pursuant to the minority oppression doctrine, recognized
by an increasing number of relevant jurisdictions throughout the
country. There are, however, some straightforward sanitizing steps
VC investors can build into their daily practice to both deter and
defend such potential claims. An overview of such practices is
briefly outlined and recommended here.
A. Add Explicit Protections into Initial Investment
Documents
The issues raised by this article highlight the complex
nature of the relationship between the angel investor and the
venture capitalist. Both serve necessary but insufficient roles in
the venture creation process, and both grow potentially adversarial
toward each other as the company moves toward exit, with each
vying for a large piece of the pie. Those who structure these
relationships must balance fairness toward the minority with
freedom of the majority. The foundations are set in the company's
organizing documents. Accordingly,
[d]rafters of the organizing documents of a closely
held corporation cannot avoid a trade-off. On the
one hand, they must provide some protection to
minority investors to ensure that they receive an
adequate return on the minority shareholder's
investment if the venture succeeds. On the other
hand, they cannot give the minority too many rights,
for the minority might exercise their rights in an
opportunistic fashion to divert returns.
185 EASTERBROOK & FISHEL, supra note 18, at 238.
SPRING 20051 BURNED ANGELS
This balance can only be achieved by adding as much
clarity and explanation to a company's legal documentation as
possible. Comprehensive anticipation of conflict at the
relationship's outset is the best way to avoid subsequent disputes
and, in turn, formal litigation. Indeed, some have argued that the
process of filling in the gaps that a company omitted when
originally structuring the relationship between and among its
shareholders is all a court should do when a dispute arises. 186
Adding anticipation and clarity to the organizational and
investment documents is a solution that should resonate with the
judiciary, particularly those jurisdictions seeking to protect and
preserve the reasonable expectations of angel investors. The best
way to do so while leaving little to chance is simply to specify and
enumerate those expectations with precision. Doing so would take
the guesswork out of the process for a reviewing court, and deter
dispute altogether by anticipating and resolving potential issues
before the fact.
For example, a venture capitalist negotiating an investment
in a new company may require that the deal's closing
documentation include an agreement, signed by all of the
company's angel investors, acknowledging the possibility of
dilution-causing events in the future should the company not
perform in accordance with the VC's financing strategy. Angels
with high expectations of a company coupled with high confidence
in the performance ability of the management team should be held
accountable for their optimistic expectation, and agree at the outset
that a slip or delay in the company's development will result in
some kind of ownership transfer from them to the venture capital
investor. Alternatively, the VC and angel investor could negotiate
an arrangement during a down round scenario that guarantees an
angel's anti-dilution protection, perhaps by converting an angel's
previously purchased security into the security purchased by the
VC.187 This would be especially important for angels who only
186 See id. at 250 ("The right inquiry is always what the parties would have
contracted for had transactions costs been nil .... ").
187 This has been referred to as the Next Round Pricing Strategy, and usually
takes the form of a convertible note which accepts the angel's investment capital
at the company's inception, but defers the terms and value of the note's
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own common stock at the time of the first institutional round
financing. It also could better align the angel's interest with those
of the venture investor, and better mitigate a divergence of those
interests down the road. To stave off the threat of converting an
angel's holdings back to less desirable common stock, angels could
negotiate an ability to satisfy the requirements of a pay to play
round without having to invest their full pro rata amount.
B. Take Appropriate Actions at the Time of a
Conflicting Interest Transaction
Venture capital investors who control a start-up company
recognize two important aspects of a down round or insider round
transaction: (1) they stand to benefit from the extra stock they will
acquire possibly at the dilutive expense of the minority angel
investor shareholders and (2) such benefit gained by majority
shareholders to the detriment of the minority shareholders may not
be considered fair by a court reviewing the deal at a later time. In
such situations, VC investors usually ask their attorneys to set forth
certain steps and procedures they could take which might make the
deal more equitable. These steps generally include holding a rights
offering, solicitation of a fairness opinion, formation and approval
of a special independent board committee, and solicitation of
minority shareholder approval of a given transaction. For various
reasons, only the last of these prescribed measures offers legitimate
perceived and actual protection for venture capital investors in
start-up companies.
conversion into equity until the time that the VC's institutional round is
negotiated. See Joseph W. Bartlett, The Next Round Pricing Strategy, 1312
PLI/CoRP. 263 (June 2002). Such convertible notes typically have a conversion
price discount or warrant coverage bonus that compensates the angel investor
for the extra risk of investing at the earlier time.
188 These are, of course, only a few generic examples of actions to be
considered. A company's or investor's counsel should structure any sanitizing
measures to address the risks and concerns of each particular set of
circumstances.
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1. Rights Offerings
A rights offering is the opportunity, offered by the
company, for all shareholders to participate and invest in a
financing round that is arguably favorable to insider VC investors,
even those who do not have preemptive participation or other
contractual rights to do so. This exercise is grounded in two
rationales: (1) it supposedly prevents VCs from being perceived as
selfish by hoarding participation in an investor-friendly
transaction; and (2) it provides all shareholders, including common
holders, with the ability to invest in the round and mitigate any
dilution they might otherwise suffer.1 89 The problem, of course,
lies in the weaker participation capabilities of angel versus VC
investors. An insider or down round could be several million
dollars in size, 190 with each VC investing several million by itself
Individual angel investors who have supported the company for a
period of time longer than the VCs and who rely on their personal
funds to participate may be nearing or even beyond their
comfortable investment maximum. 191 Indeed, it is rare that angel
investors have sufficient staying power to participate in financing
rounds from the company's inception all the way through to exit,
even if offered the opportunity to do so via rights offerings at each
stage. 192 As a result, courts generally concede that the provision of
189 The concept of a rights offering originated in the New York judiciary with an
early recognition of the need to stem dilution from minority shareholders. See
Katzoqitz v. Sidler, 249 N.E.2d 358, 363 (N.Y. 1969) ("[L]egislation fixed the
right with respect to proportionate voting but left to the judiciary the role of
protecting existing shareholders from dilution of their equity.").
0 As venture capital fund sizes grew in the late 1990s so did the need to deploy
larger amounts of money in a single financing transaction. Practical limitations
preclude a firm with ten general partners controlling a $1 billion fund to make
investments of $2 million or $3 million in each deal.
191 See Blomberg, supra note 138, at 64 ("[I]t is often the case that common
stockholders in a company like this will not have the money to invest in such a
financing and most boards know this-so the opportunity is seen as a mere
gesture.").
192 See Bartlett & Garlitz, supra note 7, at 601. Bartlett and Garlitz note that
[d]epending on the attitude of the board (which may be VC-
controlled), the founder and other common shareholders may
or may not have been invited to participate in the dilutive
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a rights offering to angel investors is little more than an illusory
privilege.'
9 3
2. Fairness Opinions
Public companies frequently engage investment banks or
other financial service firms to provide fairness opinions to assess
an objective valuation of an asset or proposed transaction. Boards
seek out and pay handsomely for these opinions which help to
sanitize a transaction against claims of unreasonable pricing or
unfair dealing. Engaging a bank and commissioning such a letter
are both time consuming and costly, two things a start-up company
cannot afford. Courts have regularly held that a hastily prepared or
poorly researched fairness opinion will not hold weight in any
subsequent dispute, 194 making them even more impractical for the
time-pressured and cash-sensitive start-up. Consequently, it is rare
and would likely be considered wasteful and impractical for a start-
up to obtain a fairness opinion prior to consummating a
questionable transaction.
3. Special Independent Board Committees
Special independent committees are similarly impractical at
the start-up company stage for the simple reason that board
members are almost never legitimately independent. This is
another mechanism used at the public company level, and
rounds of financing. If invited, however, the invitation may be
more technical than real because the founder, [angels] and
others may have lacked the resources necessary to preserve
their percentage interest in the company.
Id.
193 See Bartlet & Garlitz, supra note 7, at 619 ("[J]udges seem to see through
this false appearance to the economic realities.").
194 See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); In
re Trans World Airlines, Inc. Shareholder Litig., No. CIV.A.9844, 1988 WL
111271, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM
Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 457
A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); MacLane Gas Co. Ltd. v. Enserch Corp., No.
CIV.A.10760, 1992 WL 368614 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 1992).
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supported by court decisions in leading jurisdictions as a means to
ensure conflicting interest transactions are fair, with no relevant
start-up company counterpart. Start-up company boards are often
comprised entirely of investors and management. 195 Even if such a
company could find and convince an independent individual to
serve on the board (a particularly difficult task in the current
climate of increased director scrutiny and liability), 96 that
individual would likely be compensated with options or some other
equity derivative beyond mere cash. But even where equity
consideration is not granted, relationship dynamics may impede
the independent director's objective judgment.' 97 In fact, the
ability to present a director as truly independent is becoming
increasingly difficult in private and public companies alike. The
Delaware Chancery Court recently increased the standard for
independence in a case involving Oracle Corporation.'98 The court
noted the traditional test for independence was too heavily
dependent on the existence of economic ties or the "domination
and control" of others. The new standard, articulated in a decision
that found a seemingly independent board committee to be
"fraught with conflicts," focuses not only on economic ties but also
the social and personal interactions between the members of the
independent committee and the majority shareholders in a manner
that might influence their decisions against protecting the
minority. 199 This newly raised standard will likely be applied with
even greater scrutiny in the start-up company context where
relationships are close and conflicts of interest are bound to
195 See Part III, supra for a discussion of start-up board membership.
196 The difficult task of identifying and securing one independent individual for
service on a start-up company board is required for a legitimate independent
special committee on the board of a Delaware corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 141(c)(2). It is even more difficult in California, which requires at least
two independent directors to comprise a legitimate independent special
committee. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 311.
197 See Bartlet & Garlitz, supra note 7, at 620 ("Even though a director may be
technically 'disinterested,' it is unlikely that real neutrality will be present. The
VCs on occasion will induce a third party to join the board, but the reality is that
appointees of that nature will be allies of the VC investors.").
198 See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).199 See id.
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influence board level decisions.
4. Solicitation of Minority Shareholder
Approval
There remains one sanitizing action that may legitimate a
board's actions in the face of an unfair dealing claim-securing the
explicit and affirmative approval of the minority shareholders. Not
surprisingly, it is probably the most difficult sanitizing action to
realize, both because of the nature of the shareholder base or the
nature of a transaction's terms. When assessing the validity of a
transaction involving an interested director, both Delaware and
California have statutory safe harbor provisions that specifically
reference minority shareholder approval as a means of bolstering a
transaction's independent legitimacy. 20 However, even in director
liability cases where the interested directors satisfy the safe harbor
provisions, doing so does not by itself validate an otherwise
voidable transaction. Rather, minority shareholder approval would
merely shift the burden of proof from the defendant to the plaintiff,
with the aggrieved shareholder now forced to prove that a
transaction was unfair.20 1 In some decisions, however, this burden
shift has been almost expressly dispositive of the outcome.20 2
C. Business Exigency is the Best Defense
Arguably the most effective defense for a VC is the
200 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 144(a)(1)-(3) (2001); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 3 10(a)(1)-(3); see also JOSEPH F. TROY AND WILLIAM D. GOULD, ADVISING
AND DEFENDING CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS § 4.5 at 91 (Oct. 2000).
201 See In re Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 663 A.2d
1194, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1995); Flieger v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del.
1976) (noting that meeting a statutory safe harbor "merely removes an
'interested director' cloud" but that "[n]othing in the statute... removes the
transaction from judicial scrutiny").
202 See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) ("In all
events, informed, uncoerced, disinterested shareholder ratification of a
transaction in which corporate directors have a material conflict of interest has
the effect of protecting the transaction from judicial review except on the basis
of waste.").
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"business exigency defense," which recognizes that the company
simply has no other choice but to accept the terms of a dilutive
transaction or else face bankruptcy or dissolution. This defense
generally requires the existence of two key facts: (1) that the
company is truly on the verge of collapse and a heavily dilutive
round is the only possible means of keeping operations running,20 3
and (2) that the company (and the VCs) have affirmatively sought
204and exhausted all other possible financing alternatives. The
nature and extent of a corporate emergency or the definition of an
"exhaustive search" are still being shaped by the courts, but initial
decisions set the bar fairly high.2 °5 Moreover, VC investors who
participate in the transaction will bear the burden of proving the
existence and legitimacy of both components to the defense.20 6
Attorneys who counsel companies through such difficult
periods should take two procedural steps to help sanitize the terms
of an emergency financing transaction. First, efforts should be
made to keep all shareholders well-informed of the company's
cash situation and fundraising process. This might take the form of
a memorandum from the company's board of directors addressed
to its shareholders, preferably with periodic updates. The memo
should mention the reasons for the company's difficult financial
situation, the opportunities and strategies for the company to
resolve its difficulties, and the steps the board is taking to do so.
This helps maintain full disclosure in a documented format and
deters shareholder claims of board conspiracy or lack of
transparency. It also has the positive effect of soliciting assistance
from shareholders who have a strong interest in identifying
suggested solutions to the company's troubles.
A second, more powerful means of bolstering a venture
203 See Rosenberg v. Oolie, No. 11,134, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 152 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 16, 1989); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. Ch. 1987).204 See Box v. Northrop Corp., 459 F.Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd mem.,
598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979); Rosenberg v. Oolie, at *12.
205 See id. at 550 (noting that the company aggressively solicited investment
interest from over forty investment entities with no interest); Rosenberg v.
Oolie, at * 12 (noting that the company engaged two placement agencies to raise
funding with no success for "several years" prior to the consummation of the
dilutive transaction).206 See Browning v. C&C Plywood Corp., 434 P.2d 339 (Or. 1967).
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capitalist's defense in the face of an oppression claim involves
incorporating substantial detail and acknowledgement into the
shareholder and board resolutions to be approved in conjunction
with the transaction. The resolutions should set forth a history of
the emergency and the fundraising process, with an explicit intent
to satisfy the two components of the exigency defense: (1)
emergency conditions and (2) no alternatives. Specific detail of
the number and nature of funding solicitation meetings held,
reasons for declines, travel and other efforts invested by
management to pursue alternatives, and other evidence of
exhaustive measures taken should be mentioned and formally
acknowledged by as many shareholders as possible, with
unanimous shareholder approval if at all possible.
VII. Conclusion
Angel investors who have suffered significant dilutive
financings during the nadir of the technology markets of late may
soon be forced to stand by and watch as the companies in which
they once held a substantial equity position reach exit events in
which they are unable to participate. Venture capital investors, on
the other hand, are likely to benefit from these exit events, in some
cases as a result of a questionable prior washout transaction at the
expense of an aggrieved "burned angel." Chances are that at least
one of these burned angels will have the resources to quantify the
loss and bring a suit against the VCs in one of the four jurisdictions
covered here: Massachusetts, California, New York, or Delaware.
The angel plaintiff could make a claim derived from that state's
minority oppression doctrine, if not explicitly then implicitly,
under Delaware's entire fairness standard as applied to controlling
shareholders, and set what could be a frightening precedent for the
VC industry. An aggrieved angel's claim might well be judicially
recognized, possibly resulting in damages to a VC defendant and
sounding a wake up call to an unsuspecting venture industry which
may be currently unconcerned by the prospect of such claims. A
single plaintiff victory may trigger a wave of similar suits, quickly
forcing VCs into an unprecedented defensive position.
The outcome of any such triggering case would depend
BURNED ANGELSSPRING 2005]
heavily on the particular facts and circumstances, of course, which
mitigates the risk of a particular VC's exposure. To avoid any
liability, venture capital investors should educate themselves about
the issues raised here, recognize the duties held by their positions
as influential shareholders separate from their director duties, and
operate with an awareness of potential legal action by angel
investors. In general, the angel's equity interests should be
protected and preserved to the same extent as all other
shareholders, information about the company's status should be
free and transparent, and any compromise of an angel's interests
should only be done after all other alternatives have been
exhausted. The VC's legal counsel should document these efforts
diligently and build a record of actions that tracks the relevant
jurisdiction's legal standard to survive a claim of minority
oppression. In sum, if VCs act honestly, diligently, in the best
interests of all company shareholders, and with a genuine effort to
obtain the approval (or at least acknowledgement) of angel
investors in all financing transactions, they will be ready to present
a credible defense to any claims.
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